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Once upon a time, constitutional challenges to contempt of court
holdings were a staple of United States free expression
jurisprudence. Judicial contempt powers had long been used by
English common law courts to prevent disruptions of their
proceedings, and, over time, these powers had expanded to
encompass judicial authority to punish out-of-court speech acts that
might negatively impact public esteem for the judiciary. In the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, U.S. trial judges in both
state and federal courts regularly imposed criminal sanctions on
persons who had publicly commented on pending judicial
proceedings in ways that (from the judges’ perspectives) cast
aspersions on the character of the judges or the legitimacy of their
courts. These sanctions were often imposed on legal strangers (i.e.,
persons who were not parties to any pending cases at the court), and
they were typically imposed by trial judges acting unilaterally
following summary procedures that lacked basic elements of due
process. Those who were convicted under such procedures regularly
objected on freedom of expression (FoE) grounds, and U.S. appellate
courts eventually imposed significant constitutional limits on the
practice. By the second half of the twentieth century, mere public
criticism of a judge or her court virtually never led to contempt
sanctions. U.S. appellate courts still receive free speech cases
regarding judicial contempt orders, but these cases now consist of
conflicts over gag orders, illegal contact with jurors, the publication
of sealed materials, and the like, evincing a significant narrowing
over time of the definition of interference with a pending case.
A wide range of courts outside the United States now enforce
constitutional FoE principles as well, but courts in many jurisdictions
continue to suppress anti-judicial speech. For example, when Chilean
journalist Alejandra Matus published a book-length exposé on the
Chilean judiciary in 1999, Supreme Court Justice Servando Jordan
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banned the book and issued a warrant for Matus’s arrest.5 Justice
Jordan’s order held that Matus’s Black Book of Chilean Justice was
in violation of a 1957 State Security Law that prohibited defamation
of the President, Ministers of State, members of the superior courts,
and a number of other named office holders.6 The Chilean insult
laws, known as “leyes de desacato,” authorized the use of summary
procedures to allow confiscation of insulting publications and
punishment of their authors.7 As such, Matus’s book was seized from
the publisher, and Matus herself escaped arrest only by fleeing the
country and seeking asylum in the United States.8 Only after the
relevant desacato law was repealed in 2001 was she able to return to
Chile and was her book freely distributed.9 In Singapore, when three
protesters wore T-shirts with pictures of a kangaroo dressed as a
judge in and around the Supreme Court’s building while the court
itself was hearing a seditious libel case involving alleged defamation
of Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Minister Mentor Lee Kuan
Yew, the court held the protesters in contempt.10 In doing so, the
court emphasized that “there are limits to the right of fair criticism”
and that the T-shirts at issue “amounted to a deliberate and
provocative attack on the court, falling far outside the realm of fair
and reasoned criticism.”11
The judicial suppression of anti-judicial speech has a long history
and has been defended on a number of grounds. Its most enduring
5. Alejandra Matus, The Black Book of Chilean Justice, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV.
329, 330 (2002).
6. Id. at 336.
7. Id. at 337.
8. Id. at 335-36 (noting that Matus was granted asylum in November 1999).
9. Id. at 345.
10. Attorney-General v. Tan Liang Joo John & Ors [2009] SGHC 41 (Sing.), in
WEN-CHENG CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: CASES AND MATERIALS
690, 690-92 (2014).
11. Id. at 690-91; cf. Shadrake Alan v. Attorney-General, Court of Appeal,
[2011] SGCA 26 (Sing.), http://www.commonlii.org/sg/cases/SGCA/2011/26.html
(discussing a Singaporean Supreme Court case in which a contempt citation and
six-week prison sentence were upheld against Alan Shadrake for controversial
passages in his book, Once a Jolly Hangman: Singapore Justice in the Dock,
alleging that the country’s courts issued criminal sentencing decisions based on
international trade and business interests rather than neutral applications of the
law).
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justification has been that it is necessary to protect the rule of law—
both in the narrow sense that public criticism of judges might
sometimes represent an effort to sway judicial decisions in a
particular case and in the broader sense that such criticism might
undermine public confidence in the judiciary and hence negatively
impact compliance with judicial orders.12 As the Chilean and
Singaporean examples suggest, however, the actual use of such
repressive powers by courts might reflect different motives. In Chile,
Justice Jordan sought to prohibit distribution of a book alleging that
the country’s “judiciary has bent easily to political, economic, and
military pressure,” particularly during the Pinochet dictatorship when
Jordan himself had first been named to the court.13 In Singapore, the
Supreme Court used its contempt powers as an adjunct to its
repressive powers to punish seditious libel; the court was in the
process of sanctioning public criticism of the country’s prime
minister, and in the meantime it decided to sanction public criticism
of its own role in that process.14
In this paper, we review the origins of contempt of court in
English law, survey its evolution in nineteenth- and twentiethcentury U.S. cases, where its most aggressive uses were eventually
overridden by constitutional FoE principles, and then assess whether
and to what degree constitutional courts in other jurisdictions have
followed a similar path. Here, we have sought to identify as many
jurisdictions as possible in which constitutional courts have explicitly
grappled with the question of whether and how constitutional (or
quasi-constitutional) FoE principles limit the suppression of antijudicial speech. Where courts have tolerated the suppression of such
speech, we assess the consistency of those holdings with the usually
stated justification of protecting judicial authority and the rule of
law. In particular, we argue that courts committed to democracyreinforcing principles of free expression must distinguish between
12. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RAPID RESPONSE TO UNFAIR AND UNJUST
CRITICISM OF JUDGES 1, 4-6 (2008) (listing guidelines to help determine when to
respond to attacks on the judiciary).
13. Matus, supra note 5, at 330 (emphasizing that judicial system in Chile has
been far from independent and has not truly reformed to become a democratic
system of government).
14. See Shadrake Alan, [2011] SGCA 26.
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hurt judicial feelings and actual dangers to the rule of law and must
err on the side of protecting the freedom to criticize courts. We focus
this analysis principally on the decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), which has the richest body of jurisprudence
on this question outside the United States.

CONTEMPT OF COURT IN ENGLISH LAW
The phrase “contempt of court” has been used in English law since
the twelfth century and was firmly established by the fourteenth.15 Its
initial use was to describe defaults and other wrongful acts by parties
before the court (or by officers of the court), but it was extended over
time to cover acts by legal strangers (i.e., non-parties) out of court.16
With the arrival of the printing press in the fifteenth century,
newspaper criticism of pending cases became the most common
form of criminal contempt, on the theory that libeling a judge in his
official capacity would undermine judicial authority and make the
public less likely to submit to it.17
In a definitive early-twentieth-century treatment, Sir John C. Fox
argued that for contempts committed in the presence of the court,
punishments had been imposed by summary procedures from time
immemorial (i.e., as far back as English legal records were
available).18 By the eighteenth century, English judges were using
summary procedures to punish out-of-court contempts as well.19
Blackstone’s Commentaries claimed that summary punishment for
“speaking or writing contemptuously of the court, or judges, acting
in their judicial capacity . . . must necessarily be as ancient as the
laws themselves,” but for contempts committed out of court by legal
strangers, Fox finds no evidence to support the claim prior to 1721.20
Blackstone referred to such out-of-court contempts as “consequential
contempts;” today, they are more often known as “constructive
15. JOHN C. FOX, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE FORM OF TRIAL
AND THE MODE OF PUNISHMENT 46 (1972).
16. Id. at 46.
17. Id. at 54.
18. Id. at 100.
19. Id. at 16.
20. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*282 (1769); see FOX, supra note 15, at 18.
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contempts” or, in some jurisdictions, as the offence of “scandalizing
the court.”21
Blackstone appears to have relied on the views of Mr. Justice
Wilmot, whose undelivered judgment in Almon’s Case (1765)
likewise claimed that summary punishments had long been imposed
even for contempts committed out of court.22 This case began when
bookseller John Almon published a pamphlet accusing Lord
Mansfield of arbitrary decision-making in a case against John
Wilkes.23 The 1764 pamphlet was itself a protest against the use of
summary procedures to prosecute seditious libel.24 It charged Lord
Mansfield “with having introduced a method of proceeding to
deprive the subject of the benefit of the Habeas Corpus Act” and
with amending an information (i.e., a criminal charge brought
without grand jury indictment) “officiously, arbitrarily, and
illegally.”25 Wilmot’s opinion was not delivered and remained
unpublished until after his death, but then became a leading
authority.26 The opinion held that libels on a judge in his official
capacity could be summarily punished (i.e., by the judge alone,
without a jury trial), on the grounds that such libels “excite[] in the
minds of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial
determination and indispose[] their minds to obey them” and might
also be taken as “an impeachment of [the King’s] . . . wisdom and
goodness in the choice of his Judges.”27
Regardless of when it emerged, this judicial practice developed
into “a highly useful weapon for those in power because it provided
an alternative prosecutorial remedy to criminal libel that was not
dependent on a jury.”28 Not surprisingly, the practice proved
21. Joseph J. Chused, Public Comment as Contempt of Court, 16 ST. LOUIS L.
REV. 24, 25-33 (1930).
22. FOX, supra note 15, at 21 (comparing Blackstone’s thoughts to Wilmot’s).
23. Id. at 34.
24. Id. (noting that throughout the pamphlet no complaint is made of libels on
the court by attachment).
25. Id. at 223.
26. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure
in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of
Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1046-48 (1924).
27. FOX, supra note 15, at 105, 110 (quoting and then paraphrasing Wilmot).
28. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY
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controversial with critics regularly observing that it allowed the
judge who was libeled to serve simultaneously as party, prosecutor,
judge, and jury.29 English judges, for their part, jealously guarded the
powers once they had developed. For example, the 1792 Fox’s Libel
Act provided that the question of whether a publication was libelous
was for the jury—not the judge—to decide, but in the contempt-ofcourt context, judges following Wilmot’s doctrine thwarted this goal
of the act.30 The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
witnessed repeated efforts in Parliament to enact legislation directly
targeting arbitrary judicial contempt powers, but none were
successful.31 Perhaps most notable was the 1883 debate over Lord
Selborne’s Contempts of Court Bill during which Lord Fitzgerald
observed that the existing practice of summarily punishing out-ofcourt commentary on pending cases “did not exist in any other
country” and had the effect of “enforc[ing] silence on the part of the
press when the public interests required the fullest publicity and the
closest criticism of what was going on.”32
Heeding such sentiments, the Privy Council suggested in McLeod
v. St. Aubyn (1899) that the offense of scandalizing the court had
become “obsolete” in England, where “[c]ourts are satisfied to leave
to public opinion attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to
them.”33 But this claim was not actually true at the time since English
courts continued to subject out-of-court criticism of judges to
contempt sanctions. For example, while presiding over an obscenity
trial at the Birmingham Spring Assizes in March 1900, Mr. Justice
Darling warned the assembled members of the press that while “a
newspaper has the right to publish accounts of proceedings in a law
court . . . there is absolutely no protection to a newspaper for the
publishing of objectionable, indecent, and obscene matter, and any
newspaper which does so may be as easily prosecuted as anybody
else, and if I find my advice disregarded I shall make it my business
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LEGACY OF ENGLISH LAW
1, 2 (2010).
29. Id. at 2-3.
30. FOX, supra note 15, at 34-42.
31. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 26, at 1049-50.
32. FOX, supra note 15, at 42.
33. McLeod v. St. Aubyn [1899] A.C. 549 (PC) (U.K.).
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to see that the law is in that respect enforced.”34 After the defendant
was convicted and sentenced, Howard Alexander Gray published an
article titled “A Defender of Decency,” which observed that “[t]he
terrors of Mr Justice DARLING will not trouble the Birmingham
reporters very much.35 No newspaper can exist except upon its
merits, a condition from which the Bench, happily for Mr Justice
DARLING, is exempt. There is not a journalist in Birmingham who
has anything to learn from the impudent little man in horse-hair, a
microcosm of deceit and empty-headedness, who admonished the
Press yesterday.”36 Mr. Gray was held in contempt, with Lord
Russell observing for the Queen’s Bench that “[A]ny act done or
writing published, calculated to bring the court or a judge of the
court into contempt or to lessen his authority, is a contempt of
court.”37 Lord Russell admonished that this power should “be
exercised with scrupulous care . . . [and] only where the case is clear
beyond reasonable doubt”; it should not be used to suppress
“reasonable argument . . . against any judicial act as contrary to law
or the public good.”38 These caveats did not apply here, as the court
considered Gray’s criticisms unreasonable and hence levied a fine of
£100 plus court costs.39
The Privy Council’s claim that the crime of scandalizing the court
was obsolete was not true in 1899, but it became true over the course
of the twentieth century.40 In Ambard v. Attorney-General of
34. Reg. v. Gray [1900] 82 L. TIMES 534, 534-36 (U.K.).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 535.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 536 (observing that Gray himself admitted that the article he wrote
against Justice Darling was a result of his strong feelings which he realized cannot
be justified, and that he deeply regrets his decision to publish the article).
40. See Michael K. Addo, Scandalizing the Court in England and Wales, in
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE CRITICISM OF JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STANDARDS 31, 42 (Michael K. Addo ed., 2000) (noting that
while the offense is still part of the law in countries such as England and Wales, it
is rarely ever used); Oyiela Litaba, Does the ‘Offence’ of Contempt by
Scandalising the Court Have a Valid Place in the Law of Modern Day Australia?,
8 DEAKIN L. REV. 113, 117 (2003) (describing the offense as narrowly defined
because “it exists solely to protect the administration of justice rather than the
feelings of judges”).
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Trinidad and Tobago (1936), Lord Atkin famously observed that
“[j]ustice is not a cloistered virtue: [S]he must be allowed to suffer
the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of
ordinary men.”41 In R v. Commissioner of Police, ex parte Blackburn
(1968), Lord Denning insisted that “[we judges] do not fear criticism,
nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at
stake. . . . It is the right of every man, in parliament or out of it, in the
Press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken
comment on matters of public interest. . . . Mr Quintin Hogg has
criticized the court, but in so doing he is exercising his undoubted
right.”42 By 1985, Lord Diplock was able to note in passing that “the
species of contempt of court which consists of ‘scandalising the
judges’ . . . is virtually obsolescent in England,”43 and, by this point,
the observation was indeed accurate.44

CONTEMPT OF COURT IN U.S. LAW
In the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts
the power “to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of
said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing
before” them.45 With or without express statutory authority, state
courts generally assumed that they had similar powers.46 As such,
and from the beginning, U.S. judges regularly censored public
criticism of themselves by holding critics in contempt of court on the
grounds that such criticism harmed the public’s faith in the
impartiality of the judicial system. In other words, of the two
justifications offered by Mr. Justice Wilmot for the summary
punishment of constructive contempts, U.S. courts understandably
omitted mention of impugning the King’s wisdom in his selection of
judges, but retained Wilmot’s concern that intemperate critiques
might undermine public compliance with judicial orders.47
41. Ambard v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 704 (PC)
(U.K.).
42. R. v. Metro. Police Comm’r, ex parte Blackburn (No. 2) [1968] 2 All ER
319, 320 (U.K.).
43. Addo, supra note 40, at 39.
44. See id.
45. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83 (1789).
46. BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 263-64.
47. Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss King, Contempt by Publication in the United
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As with English courts, disputes quickly arose regarding the
legitimate scope of these contempt powers. Consider the 1780s
conflict between Thomas McKean, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, and Eleazer Oswald, the printer and publisher
of the Independent Gazetteer, which nicely illustrates the state’s use
of contempt proceedings to evade limits on other modes of
repression.48 The story starts in 1782, when Oswald’s newspaper
published criticism of Chief Justice McKean’s conduct of a trial
involving two Army officers.49 McKean ordered Oswald arrested for
seditious libel and required him to post a £750 bond until trial, which
would be forfeited if Oswald continued to publish seditious material
in the interim.50 Oswald nonetheless continued to attack the Chief
Justice in print, among other things for speculating in Continental
Army certificates (i.e., getting rich off of distressed soldiers who
were owed back wages), and on the day the grand jury met to
consider his case, the Gazetteer published “A Hint to the Grand
Jury,” instructing the jurors on Oswald’s understanding of libel law.51
The grand jury refused to indict, despite significant pressure from
Chief Justice McKean, and the episode helped lead the Pennsylvania
constitutional convention to provide that truth was a defense to libel
claims and that the jury was entitled to judge both the law and the
facts.52
The conflict continued in 1787-88, when Oswald was one of the
first Pennsylvania printers to publish Anti-Federalist critiques of the
newly proposed U.S. Constitution, including sharp criticisms of Ben
Franklin and George Washington for supporting it. In response,
Andrew Browne, a local teacher who had allegedly been defamed in
one of the articles, sued for libel.53 Oswald then published “An
Address to the Public,” which characterized Browne as a tool of
Oswald’s Federalist opponents, denounced libel law as inconsistent
with liberty, and called into question the impartiality of the judges
States: To the Federal Contempt Statute, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 409 (1928).
48. BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 248-51.
49. Id. at 249.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 250.
52. Id. at 250 n.25; see also LUCAS A. POWE, THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE
CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 34-40 (1991).
53. BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 251.
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hearing the case against him.54 Browne’s counsel then moved for an
attachment for contempt, and in Respublica v. Oswald (Pa. 1788),
Chief Justice McKean wrote for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
imposing a fine and one month imprisonment on Oswald.55 This
holding appears to be the first American case imposing summary
punishment for contempt by publication.56
In 1802, the same court fined and imprisoned Thomas Passmore
for publishing an article defaming two insurance underwriters who
had been ordered to pay a claim that Passmore had filed.57 At the
time of publication, the underlying insurance dispute was pending in
the state Supreme Court.58 The court noted that libel claims would
ordinarily be heard by a jury, but that contempts of court were an
exception to this rule, and it held summarily that Passmore’s
publication amounted to a contempt in that it threatened to bias the
public mind and hence prejudice the administration of justice.59 Both
the Oswald and Passmore decisions were followed by efforts to
impeach the judges responsible for them, and they led the
Pennsylvania legislature in 1809 to enact a statute that limited the
contempt power to “misbehavior of any person in the presence of the
court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice” and provided
that publications out of court should not be the basis of summary
punishment.60
A similar sequence of events took place at the federal level in the
1820s and 30s. After issuing a decision in 1825, federal District
Judge James H. Peck published his opinion in a St. Louis newspaper,
a common practice where official reports were unavailable.61
54. Id.
55. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319, 329 (1788); Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12
F. Cas. 359, 367 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (holding that U.S. courts at common law have
the “lawful discretion” to punish contempts without a jury trial).
56. Nelles & King, supra note 47, at 409-10.
57. Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yeates 441, 442 (Pa. 1802).
58. Id.
59. Id.; Nelles & King, supra note 47, at 409-10.
60. BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 263; FOX, supra note 15, at 225; Nelles &
King, supra note 47, at 412-15 (explaining that the legislation enacted to confine
summary powers was done “on a theory of American necessity” and on the basis
of its true historic limits).
61. Nelles & King, supra note 47, at 426-28 n.142.
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Attorney Luke Lawless, whose client had lost his case in Judge
Peck’s courtroom, responded with a letter to the editor rebutting
Peck’s arguments.62 Lawless’s letter focused on the legal arguments
at issue and did not impugn Judge Peck’s motives, but Peck held him
in contempt and barred him from practice in the federal courts for 18
months.63 For this abuse of the contempt power, Judge Peck was then
impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives. Judge Peck’s
subsequent acquittal by the U.S. Senate might have had the effect of
reinforcing the doctrine that summary punishments were permissible
for contempts committed out of court, but Representative James
Buchanan, who had served as Chief Manager of the impeachment,
quickly set about to win a legislative correction of this doctrine.64
Within five weeks of Peck’s acquittal, Buchanan had shepherded
new restrictions on the contempt power into law. This 1831 statute,
entitled “An Act declaratory of the law concerning contempts of
court,” provided that the power of federal courts “to issue
attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court
shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehaviour
of any person or persons in the presence of the said courts or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of
any of the officers of the said courts in their official transactions and
the disobedience or resistance of any officer . . . party, juror, witness
or any other person or persons, to any lawful . . . command of the
said courts.”65 At least seven state legislatures followed up by
enacting similar statutes.66 As far as these legislatures were
concerned, contempts committed out of court—such as libels on
judges—were to be prosecuted (if at all) by indictment and jury
trial.67
For the remainder of the nineteenth century, federal courts
generally followed the 1831 Act in limiting contempt holdings to
62. Id. at 428-39.
63. Id.
64. FOX, supra note 15, at 207.
65. An Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts of Court, ch. 99, 4
Stat. 487 (1831); FOX, supra note 15, at 208.
66. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 26, at 1027; Nelles & King, supra note
47, at 525, 533.
67. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 26, at 1027.
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disruptive acts committed in or near a court.68 The reception of
parallel state statutes by state courts, however, was more mixed. For
more than a century, most judges maintained that contempt powers
were an inherent component of judicial authority and continued to
use them to punish out-of-court libels regardless of legislative limits
which they construed narrowly or sometimes invalidated.69 These
holdings either adopted a narrow, Blackstonian view of
constitutional FoE principles or else ignored such principles
altogether. Almost from the beginning, however, some judges
articulated a dissenting tradition in which judicial contempt powers
were significantly narrower than they had been at common law.70
These judges abided by state and federal statutory limits on the
contempt power and/or articulated independent constitutional limits
rooted in free expression principles. At the state level, this dissenting
tradition long predates the Supreme Court position articulated by
Justice Hugo Black in Bridges v. California (1941).71

USING THE CONTEMPT POWER TO CURTAIL
FREE EXPRESSION
The first instance in which a U.S. court held that judicial contempt
powers were inherent, and hence immune from legislative limitation,
appears to be State v. Morrill (Ark. 1855).72 When the Arkansas
Supreme Court responded to a habeas petition by freeing an accused
murderer on bail, one Mr. Morrill published an article in the Des Arc
Citizen intimating that the court’s judges had been bribed.73 Despite a
state statute expressly limiting the application of judicial contempt
68. Id. at 1027-30 (explaining that the power of the courts in punishing
contempt could “only be exercised to insure order and decorum” in the court’s
presence, to secure faithfulness on the court’s officers in their official transactions,
and to “enforce obedience to their lawful orders, judgments, and processes”);
Nelles & King, supra note 47, at 525 (providing a case example in which the U.S.
Senate declined to “stigmatize as criminal an honorable old man” to illustrate the
inherent limit of summary judicial power under the Federal Contempt statute).
69. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 26, at 1038.
70. Id. at 1028.
71. 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941) (explaining that neither a publication’s “inherent
tendency” nor “reasonable tendency” to cause substantive evil is enough to justify
a restriction of free expression under the First Amendment).
72. FOX, supra note 15, at 218.
73. State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384, 385-87 (1855).
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powers to “[w]illful disobedience” of lawful judicial orders or
“[d]isorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior, committed during
[the court’s] . . . sitting, in its immediate view and presence, and
directly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to impair the respect
due to its authority,” the court held Morrill in contempt.74 Citing one
of its own prior holdings, the court held that “[t]he power of
punishing summarily and upon its own motion, contempts offered to
its dignity and lawful authority, is one inherent in every court of
judicature.”75 The court treated the statute’s granting of judicial
contempt powers as “declaratory of what the law was before its
passage” and its purported limitation on those powers as “nothing
more than the expression of a judicial opinion of the Legislature.”76
The court acknowledged that it possessed common law contempt
powers only to the extent that such powers were consistent with U.S.
constitutional principles, but it emphasized that the state
constitutional free expression provision provided that “every citizen
may freely speak, write and print on any subject--being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty” (emphasis added by the Arkansas
Court).77 As such, the court was firmly of the opinion that U.S. courts
“possessed the power to punish, as for contempt, libelous
publications, . . . upon their proceedings pending or past, upon the
ground that they tended to degrade the tribunals; destroy that public
confidence and respect for their judgments and decrees, so
essentially necessary to the good order and well being of society, and
most effectually obstructed the free courts of justice.”78 In reaching
this judgment, the court relied extensively on Blackstone, on
Wilmot’s opinion in Almon’s case, and on the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s opinion in Respublica v. Oswald. For the remainder of the
74. Id. at 388-90 (explaining that the Arkansas statute included several
additional items on the list of lawful uses of the contempt power, which did not
include the act charged against the defendant, and finding the court has inherent
authority to punish contempt).
75. Id. at 389.
76. Id. at 391.
77. Id. at 402 (“That printing presses shall be free to every person; and no law
shall ever be made to restrain the rights thereof. The free communication of
thoughts and opinions, is one of the invaluable rights of man; and every citizen
may freely speak, write and print on any subject—being responsible for the abuse
of that liberty.”).
78. Id. at 399-400 (emphasis in original).
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nineteenth century, Morrill was widely cited by the courts of sister
states following Arkansas’s lead.79
In 1895, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)
endorsed a broad reading of judicial contempt powers—which it
characterized as inherent, summary, and unreviewable—in the
Pullman Strike case.80 The Pullman case involved a holding of
contempt for failure to obey an injunction prohibiting a strike, but, a
decade later, SCOTUS endorsed a similar reading in a case involving
anti-judicial speech. In Patterson v. Colorado (1907), the Supreme
Court upheld a contempt citation against Thomas M. Patterson, a
populist U.S. Senator and newspaper owner who had published a
series of articles and a cartoon that were critical of the Supreme
Court of Colorado.81 Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes held that the First Amendment banned prior restraint of
publication but did not limit post-publication punishment for speech
that undermined the legitimacy of the courts (or, presumably, that
contributed to any of a host of other harms).82
From one angle, the logic of constructive contempts makes sense:
Protecting the orderly administration of justice from outside
influence is a laudable goal in a democratic system, and intemperate
criticism of judicial motives might have the effect of undermining
public respect for the courts. But if courts exercise significant
governing authority in democratic societies, then their decisions must
be subject to full and free public discussion, for the same reason that
the crime of seditious libel is inconsistent with democratic
governance. In practice, the United States’ state-level cases illustrate
that the contempt power has often been aimed at protecting courts
from what appears to be legitimate criticism.
The facts behind Patterson make clear the potential for abuse. The
79. Nelles & King, supra note 47, at 535.
80. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895) (explaining the contempt power as
inherent in all courts of record, and coexisting with them by the wise provisions of
the common law, and that a court without the power effectually to protect itself
against the assaults of the lawless, or to enforce its orders, judgments, or decrees
against the recusant parties before it, “would be a disgrace to the legislation, and a
stigma upon the age”).
81. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1907).
82. Id. at 454.
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case was rooted in a long-running series of political and legal
disputes regarding labor unrest, the eight-hour day, home rule for the
City of Denver, and regulation of corporate utility interests,
culminating in a stolen gubernatorial election in 1904.83 In that
election, the people of Colorado appeared to vote out the incumbent
Republican Governor James Peabody in favor of Democrat Alva
Adams by a 9,000-vote margin and to give the Democratic Party
narrow control of both legislative chambers as well.84 On the same
day, the voters adopted an amendment increasing the size of the
Colorado Supreme Court from three to seven justices, with the
governor to appoint two new members and the remaining members
coming from a merger with the court of appeals.85 Shortly after the
election returns were published, Republicans brought an electoral
challenge before the Republican-dominated state Supreme Court,
which invalidated the elections of enough Denver Democrats to
switch control of the legislature back to Republicans.86
To ensure continued Republican dominance of the court, lameduck Governor Peabody then appointed, and the Republican Senate
confirmed, justices to the new Supreme Court seats two months
before those seats came into being. Meanwhile, Republican
legislative leaders initiated an investigation of the gubernatorial vote
and in March 1905 concluded that Peabody had actually won, thus
ousting Governor Adams.87 Peabody, however, was secretly required
to sign a resignation from office to take effect immediately upon his
inauguration, leaving Republican Lt. Governor Jesse Fuller
McDonald to take office. On June 23, 1905, the reconstituted court
severely limited the reach of a 1902 constitutional amendment
granting home rule to Denver, in effect declaring it an
unconstitutional constitutional amendment.88 This decision allowed
corporate-friendly Republicans in the county government to extend a
83. POWE, supra note 52, at 1-7.
84. Id. at 2.
85. Richard J. Snyder, The Election of 1904: An Attempt at Reform, 45 COLO.
MAG. 16, 21-22 (1968).
86. Id. at 23-24.
87. Id. at 24.
88. People ex rel. Miller v. Johnson, 86 P. 233, 234-35 (Colo. 1905); see also
People ex rel. Stidger v. Alexander, 86 P. 249, 249 (Colo. 1905); People ex rel.
Stidger v. Horan, 86 P. 252, 254 (Colo. 1905).
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major utility franchise for another twenty years.89
The day after the home rule decision, Senator Patterson published
a critical editorial in one of his newspapers, the Denver Times.
Patterson complained that “[f]or the first time in the country’s
judicial history it is announced that the people may amend their state
constitutions only just so far as a supreme court is willing that they
should. . . . In other words, a part of the state constitution is
unconstitutional—treating constitutional provisions as though they
were state statutes and subject to be annulled by measuring them
with the constitution of which they are a part.”90 The day after that,
another of Patterson’s papers, the Rocky Mountain News, published a
cartoon depicting the five justices in the majority as executioners
beheading the losing litigants in the home rule cases, alongside a
shelf full of urns containing the “ashes of other slaughtered
Democrats.”91 The caption read, “IF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
HAS OVERLOOKED ANYTHING FROM THE SUPREME
COURT, IT WILL NOW PROCEED TO ASK FOR IT.”92
Republican Attorney General Nathan C. Miller presented a
complaint to the state high court alleging that these publications
constituted contempt.93 In addition to the cartoon, Miller singled out
the concluding paragraph of the 24 June editorial, which read: “What
next? If somebody will let U.S. know what next the utility
corporations of Denver and the political machine they control will
demand, the question will be answered.”94 On Miller’s reading, this
passage suggested that the state Supreme Court “and the justices
thereof are controlled by certain corporations and by partisan
political influence, and were so controlled in rendering the decision
89. Snyder, supra note 85, at 26 (explaining that when elected Republicans
assumed office, they helped the Denver Tramway secure a twenty-year extension
of its franchise in 1906).
90. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. News-Times Publ’g Co., 84 P. 912, 913
(Colo. 1906).
91. Id. at 912.
92. Id. at 914.
93. Id. at 912 (explaining that the cartoon and articles reflected upon the honor,
purity, and integrity of the court, and were intended and formulated to hold up to
“public opprobrium” and incite public contempt for the court and its justices by
leading the people to distrust the in partiality and fairness of the court’s decisions).
94. Id.
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in said causes.”95
In response, Patterson claimed that his writings were truthful and
legitimate commentary on already concluded cases.96 Rejecting this
claim, the state high court acknowledged that it had already decided
the home rule cases at issue, but noted that it had not yet remitted
them to the lower courts; as such, they remained technically
pending.97 In this light, Patterson’s newspapers had “charged this
court, and certain of its judges, with having been influenced by
corrupt motives in their rulings in pending cases, and [had suggested]
that they would be so influenced in the final disposition of the
same.”98 Comparing constructive contempts with publication of
immoral materials, the court held that “[t]he offense consists in the
publication of such matter, and it is entirely immaterial whether the
matter published is true or false.”99 On appeal, SCOTUS also
rejected Patterson’s claims, with Holmes noting for the majority that
“the main purpose of” the freedom of speech and of the press is to
prevent prior restraints; this “preliminary freedom extends as well to
the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as
well to the true as to the false.”100
The facts of Patterson may be extreme, but the use of constructive
contempt often paralleled the Colorado Supreme Court’s tactics.
Court critics, especially those using sharp language, regularly faced
summary convictions from judges jealously protecting their power.
With only a few exceptions, nineteenth and early-twentieth-century
state supreme courts adopted standards of free speech and press that
allowed these summary prosecutions, even for statements that today
would be widely seen as legitimate commentary on public affairs.101
95. Id. at 914.
96. News-Times Publ’g Co., 84 P. at 912.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 912, 955 (noting that the contempt charges against Patterson
referenced multiple publications, commenting on multiple actions of the state high
court; most commentary focused on eight decisions issued on 23 June 1905, but
one article also referenced an additional case that the court had not yet decided,
and, with respect to this ninth case, all parties appear to have agreed that it
remained pending at the time of the published commentary).
99. Id. at 912, 956.
100. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462.
101. Lincoln Caplan, The Embattled First Amendment, AM. SCHOLAR (Mar. 4,
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State high courts routinely invoked considerations of judicial
legitimacy and the administration of justice to justify contempt
citations. When an Idaho newspaper complained that a recent
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court “aids the Republican
organization to perpetrate another steal from the people, which is in
pursuance of the conspiracy to steal the presidency of the United
States,”102 the court held the paper in contempt, fining the owners and
editors $500 each and sentencing them to 10 days in jail.103 While
true coverage of public institutions is crucial to a modern democracy,
the Idaho court treated these statements as obviously false and
unworthy of protection, complaining that the “liberty of the press is
often claimed as a cover by character assassins to gratify ill will and
passion, or to pander to the passion and prejudice of others.”104
Likewise, when a journalist published criticism of the Florida
Supreme Court, the court justified the use of contempt as a necessary
measure to “protect[] and preserve[] [judicial legitimacy] against the
attempts of designing persons to undermine its authority and destroy
its efficiency.”105 When a newspaper issued a stinging set of charges
against the Missouri Supreme Court for a recent workers’
compensation case—complaining that “the Supreme Court has at the
whipcrack of the Missouri Pacific railroad, sold its soul to the
corporations,” that “the corruption of the Supreme Court has been
thorough,” and that the “corporations have long owned the
Legislature, now they own the Supreme Court”—the court invoked
the same legitimacy-protecting function as its Florida counterpart.106
After an extensive discussion of the history of free speech and the
recognized distinction between liberty and abuse, the Missouri Court
stressed that “the press has no greater liberty [of speech] in this
2015), https://theamericanscholar.org/the-embattled-first-amendment/#.
102. McDougall v. Sheridan, 128 P. 954, 957 (Idaho 1913).
103. Id. at 954.
104. Id. at 962-63 (suggesting that this trend was part of the unethical yellow
journalism of the day, and stating that “[i]f there be a sentiment among the people
demanding the publication of falsehood and calumny, and charging courts with
selling their decisions, it must have been formed very recently from the utterances
and publications of yellow journals and muck-raking magazines”).
105. In re Hayes, 73 So. 362, 363 (Fla. 1916) (demonstrating the court did not
quote or reproduce the objectionable piece, describing it only as “a libelous article
impugning the integrity, dignity and authority of this court”).
106. State v. Shepherd, 76 S.W. 79, 80 (Mo. 1903).

712

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:4

regard than any citizen . . . [n]either has any right to scandalize any
one or any institution.”107 Adopting a position as arbiter of proper
journalistic ethics, the court complained that “there are newspapers
that have so far misconceived their proper functions, or been
misguided by other considerations, as to indulge in such practices”
that appeal to “moral perverts and degenerates.”108 The court went on
to warn that since newspapers regularly come to courts for
assistance, “[s]elf-interest should . . . induce them not to impair the
power or authority of the courts, and not to inculcate a feeling of
disrespect or want of confidence in the courts.”109
One recurring argument in these cases was that critical
commentary on pending cases might be thought to impair the
independence of the courts, but that critical commentary on past
decisions should be as free as critical commentary on the
performance of any other government institution in a democracy.
Indeed, this distinction was sometimes described as the American
rule, marking a break from English law, though Phillip Blumberg
finds the practice in nineteenth and early-twentieth century state
courts so inconsistent that the label is inapposite.110 And even when
state courts purported to endorse the distinction, they often adopted
such a broad reading of what counts as a pending case that the
distinction had very little bite. In addition to the Colorado Supreme
Court’s decision in Patterson, state high courts in Washington and
Montana rejected critics’ defenses that their commentary concerned
past cases by noting that the relevant cases had not yet been remitted
and thus technically remained pending.111 This tack was particularly
egregious in Washington, where the state Supreme Court had issued
the final merits decision eight months before the publication of
criticisms, but nonetheless held that the case was still pending in its

107. Id. at 91.
108. Id. at 95.
109. Id.
110. BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 281-82. Note, for example, Burdett v.
Commonwealth, 48 S.E. 878 (Va. 1904), in which the Virginia Supreme Court
held that the past/pending distinction was irrelevant where the publication tended
to degrade the institutional legitimacy of the courts.
111. State v. Tugwell, 52 P. 1056, 1062 (Wash. 1898); State ex rel. Haskell v.
Faulds, 42 P. 285, 286 (Mont. 1895); In re Nelson, 60 P.2d 365, 370 (Mont. 1936).
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own court.112 In Colorado, moreover, as Patterson’s lawyers had
pointed out, state law allowed a petition for rehearing any time,
which left the contempt power temporally unbounded.113
As in Morrill, when legislatures attempted to narrow the contempt
power, they continued to face judicial resistance. This resistance
sometimes took the form of narrow readings of the relevant statutory
restrictions. For example, in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States
(1918), SCOTUS held that the 1831 contempt of court act drafted by
then-Representative James Buchanan “conferred no power not
already granted and imposed no limitations not already existing.”114
Recall that this statute provided that federal judicial contempt powers
“shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior
of any person or persons in the presence of the said courts or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.”115 Chief Justice
White’s opinion did not dwell on this text, but the Court appeared to
be relying on a broad reading of the phrase, “or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice,” in order to render the statutory
limitations ineffective.116 In a brief passage, White followed
Patterson in dismissing the relevance of constitutional free
expression principles. On White’s account, the First Amendment
argument
involves in its very statement the contention that the freedom of the press
is the freedom to do wrong with impunity and implies the right to frustrate
and defeat the discharge of those governmental duties upon the
performance of which the freedom of all, including that of the press,
depends. The safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional
institutions is the very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom of the
press rests and that freedom therefore does not and cannot be held to
include the right virtually to destroy such institutions. It suffices to say
that however complete is the right of the press to state public things and
discuss them, that right as every other right enjoyed in human society is

112. Tugwell, 52 P. at 1056.
113. DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 134 (1997).
114. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 418 (1918).
115. Id. at 418 (explaining that the ruling and matters expounded in Marshall
clarified that there could be no doubt that the provision conferred no power not
already granted and imposed no limit not already existing).
116. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 26, at 1031.
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subject to the restraints which separate right from wrongdoing.117

In other cases, as in Morrill itself, this resistance took the form of
judicial invalidation of the relevant statutory restrictions. For
example, the Colorado Supreme Court preemptively announced that
the legislature could not alter the court’s contempt powers—this
announcement came seventeen years before the Patterson case—and
the Missouri Supreme Court invalidated a statute purporting to limit
contempt to actions “in the immediate view and presence” of the
court.118 Both courts viewed such legislative limitations as invasions
of the inherent powers of the judiciary.119 Several decades later, the
California Supreme Court likewise invalidated a state statutory
provision that “no speech or publication reflecting upon or
concerning any court or any officer thereof shall be treated or
punished as a contempt of such court unless made in the immediate
presence of such court while in session and in such a manner as to
actually interfere with its proceedings.”120 The state Supreme Court
reached this judgment “on the ground that the courts have inherent
power to punish for contempts, whether of a direct or constructive
nature, and that the legislature cannot constitutionally infringe on
that power.”121 This holding cited several prior holdings along the
same lines, and the state court subsequently reiterated the point in
Bridges v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Cal. 1939).122 The
latter holding, however, was reversed by SCOTUS on First
Amendment grounds.123

117. Toledo Newspaper Co., 247 U.S. at 419-20.
118. Cooper v. People ex rel. Wyatt, 22 P. 790, 796 (Colo. 1889);
Shepherd, 76 S.W. at 88; see also People ex rel. Connor v. Stapleton, 33 P. 167,
172 (Colo. 1893).
119. Shepherd, 76 S.W. at 89 (explaining that the court unanimously held that it
did not have the effect of taking away the power of courts to punish other kinds of
contempts).
120. In re San Francisco Chronicle, 36 P.2d 369, 370 (Cal. 1934).
121. Id.
122. 94 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1939).
123. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263-68 (1941).
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USING FREE EXPRESSION TO CURTAIL THE
CONTEMPT POWER
In Patterson and its ilk, both state and federal judges engaged in
profoundly arbitrary and anti-democratic behavior. After surveying
many of these cases, Blumberg concluded that “the judicial contempt
power in the states, as in the federal courts, flourished unrestrained
by federal or state constitutional or statutory guaranties for 150
years. During this lengthy period before federal constitutional
intervention [in Bridges] . . . there does not appear to be a single
state decision that imposed constitutional limitations based on its
state Constitution on the exercise of the judicial contempt power.”124
On our reading, this conclusion is overstated, as some courts
followed a different path as early as the 1840s. In other words, some
courts relied on constitutional free expression principles to limit the
contempt power. As early as 1835, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that “[t]he conduct of a judge, like that of every other
functionary, is a legitimate subject of scrutiny,” at least “where the
public good is the aim;” as such, a lawyer could not constitutionally
be disbarred for criticizing judges in a public letter to the court.125
The Pennsylvania case involved not the contempt power, but rather
the courts’ independent power to discipline attorneys who practice
before them.126 Still, the parallels are clear.127
The earliest and best-known precedent finding constitutional
limitations on the contempt power itself is Stuart v. People (Ill.
1842), in which the Illinois Supreme Court construed inherent
contempt powers narrowly so as to comport with fundamental free
expression principles.128 This case emerged out of an inter-newspaper
dispute between William Stuart, editor of the Chicago Daily
American, and John Wentworth, editor of the Chicago Morning
Democrat. On May 7, 1840, Wentworth published an article alerting
readers to the fact that he was currently empaneled as a member of
124. BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 279.
125. In re Austin, 1835 WL 2736 (Pa. 1835).
126. Id. at 2736.
127. See, e.g., id.; see also BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 279 (demonstrating
that state and federal judges engaged in arbitrary and anti-democratic behavior in
exercising their contempt power).
128. 4 Ill. 395, 404-05 (1842).
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the jury in the murder trial of People v. Stone, then pending in the
Cook County Circuit Court, with Judge John Pearson presiding.129
Later that same day, Stuart published an article objecting to Judge
Pearson’s decision to close the trial, observing that perhaps “the
weakness of his honor’s head would not admit of the noise and
confusion incident to a crowd of hearers, and a proper attention to
the cause, all at the same time.”130 Stuart also commented on the odd
spectacle of a member of a sequestered jury furnishing articles about
the trial for daily publication.131 Judge Pearson ordered Stuart to
show cause for the publication and, following Stuart’s answers to the
court’s questions, imposed a fine of $100 plus court costs.132
On a writ of error, a divided state Supreme Court reversed.133
Writing for the court’s majority, Justice Breese noted that the state
constitution “has provided that the printing presses shall be free to
every person who may undertake to examine the proceedings of any
and every department of the government, and he may publish the
truth, if the matter published is proper for public information, and the
free communication of thoughts and opinions is encouraged.”134
Breese further noted that while Stuart’s article was clearly meant to
“irritate” the presiding judge of the Stone murder trial, it was in no
way “reflecting upon his integrity, or in any way impeaching his
conduct. The paragraphs and communication published had no
tendency to obstruct the administration of justice, nor were they
thrust upon the notice of the court, by any act of [Stuart].”135
Emphasizing that the Illinois courts retained common law powers
only to the extent that such powers were consistent with state and
federal constitutional principles, Breese cautioned that if punishment
for contempt is a safeguard to preserve the integrity of judicial
institutions, it should be used sparingly:
An honest, independent and intelligent court will win its way to public
129. Id. at 397.
130. Id. at 396.
131. Id. at 405.
132. Id. at 402.
133. See id. at 406 (holding that the power to punish for contempts should be
exercised in a preservative, not a vindictive manner).
134. Stuart, 4 Ill. at 404-05.
135. Id. at 405.
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confidence, in spite of newspaper paragraphs, however pointed may be
their wit or satire, and its dignity will suffer less by passing them by
unnoticed, than by arraigning the perpetrators, trying them in a summary
way, and punishing them by the judgment of the offended party.
It does not seem to me necessary, for the protection of courts in the
exercise of their legitimate powers, that this one, so liable to abuse, should
also be conceded to them. It may be so frequently exercised, as to destroy
that moral influence which is their best possession, until finally, the
administration of justice is brought into disrepute. Respect to courts
cannot be compelled; it is the voluntary tribute of the public to worth,
virtue[,] and intelligence, and whilst they are found upon the judgment
seat, so long, and no longer, will they retain the public confidence.136

The 1842 Stuart holding stands for the proposition that
constitutional free expression principles limit the powers of courts to
punish for contempt.137 In addition, the court’s opinion suggests that
contempt powers are positive institutional authorities conferred by
legislative bodies, as opposed to inherent powers belonging to courts
regardless of popular will.138
Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s 1840 opinion in Ex
Parte Hickey read state constitutional protections as a limitation on
contempt powers “of immemorial usage and practice,” citing
Blackstone as an authority while also noting that “the doctrine of
consequential contempts, in its present broad understanding, was
unknown to and not confirmed by the earliest constitutional law of
England – magna charta.”139 The case facts here were similar to those
in most other anti-judicial speech cases heard during the nineteenth
century with one variation. As editor of the Vicksburg Sentinel,
136. Id. at 405.
137. See id. at 397 (holding that the court cannot issue a punishment for
contempt against a newspaper publication not done in the presence of the court).
138. See id. at 395 (noting that the power to punish for contempts is
acknowledged by statute and limited to acts committed in the presence of the
court).
139. See Ex parte Hickey, 12 Miss. 751, 773 (1844) (Thacher, J. concurring)
(noting that broad powers of contempt in relation to newspaper libels could not
have existed since time immemorial and “[f]or so far as the newspaper publication
of a libel upon a court is concerned, a case of the kind could not have occurred
until the time of Queen Elizabeth, when newspapers were first established, which
was three hundred and forty-three years after the date of magna charta”).
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Hickey published an article accusing Judge Coalter of the Circuit
Court of Warren County of releasing a murderer in an ongoing
trial.140 He was imprisoned for contempt of court, pardoned by the
governor, and then imprisoned again.141 The relevant Mississippi
statute provided that
[t]he courts shall have power to fine and imprison any person who may be
guilty of a contempt of the court, while sitting, either in the presence or
hearing of such court: [P]rovided, that such fine shall not exceed one
hundred dollars, and no person, for such contempt, shall be imprisoned
for a longer period than the term of the court at which the contempt shall
have been committed.142

On the court’s reading, the legislature’s enactment of these
carefully limited statutory contempt powers implied the nonexistence of an overlapping set of inherent, and unlimited, common
law contempt powers.143 Citing similar statutory limitations from
Pennsylvania and Ohio, Justice Thacher observed that in states
“established upon the same republican principles as our own, having
courts of justice of similar jurisdiction and like authority, needing the
same inherent capacity for self-preservation, and the same influence
over the public mind to render them efficacious for the ends of their
creation . . . the common law power of the judges over contempts is
found to be unnecessary and useless.”144 Meeting the question of the
role of constitutional free press protections head-on, Thacher
declared such rights “the most dearly prized offspring of our national
liberty.”145 Free speech and press were of course subject to potential
abuse, “[b]ut who would argue, because disease may float in the
140. See id. at 751 (highlighting Hickey’s accusation that Judge Coalter was a
“criminal abettor of murder”).
141. Id. at 755. The intervening gubernatorial pardon is the novel aspect of the
case. In the proceedings attached to the opinion, the Circuit Court drolly observed
that, following the pardon, “the said Walter Hickey has by some means escaped
from [Warren County] jail, and is now going at large in contempt of said order of
said court. Ignoring the pardon, the court ordered him rearrested and detained.
142. Id. at 780.
143. See id. at 780-81 (emphasizing that it should not be assumed that the
legislature overlooked an inherent power to punish contempt when it enacted the
statute giving the courts the power to punish for contempts).
144. Ex parte Hickey, 12 Miss. at 780.
145. Id. at 781.
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atmosphere, that that atmosphere should be destroyed?”146
A number of state courts noted that these free expression
considerations were particularly weighty in the context of judicial
elections, which might reasonably be thought to require open and
honest discussion of judges’ performance in office. In an 1875
holding, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the
“judiciary is [now] elective. . . . There is, therefore, the same
responsibility, in theory, in the judicial department, that exists in the
legislative and executive departments to the people, for the diligent
and faithful discharge of all duties enjoined on it; and the same
necessity exists, for public information, with regard to the conduct
and character of those intrusted [sic] to discharge those duties, in
order that the elective franchise shall be intelligibly exercised, as
obtains in regard to the other departments of the government.”147
Similarly, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a
contempt holding that had disbarred two attorneys for publishing an
article suggesting improper political motives in the handling of a
recent case, it emphasized that the published commentary was on a
past case and thus fell outside the contempt rule, but it also noted that
the shift from appointed to elected courts may have changed the
weighing of factors in contempt proceedings.148 Where once the court
had been critical of appeals to the people that might diminish
confidence in the judiciary, now it emphasized the “duty of a lawyer
to bring to the notice of the people who elect the judges every
instance of what he believes to be corruption or partisanship.”149 This
duty appertained to lawyers in particular because they have greater
knowledge of court performance than do ordinary citizens. In a later
case that began not with a contempt proceeding but with a libel suit
filed by a judge seeking reelection, the same court warned of the
potential chilling effect of a liberal use of the contempt power: “If
the voters may not speak, write, or print anything but such facts as
they can establish with judicial certainty, the right does not exist,
unless in such form that a prudent man would hesitate to exercise

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 782.
Storey v. People, 79 Ill. 45, 52-53 (1875).
In re Austin, 1835 WL at 2736.
Ex parte Steinman, 95 Pa. 220, 238 (1880).
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it.”150
In a notable Wisconsin dispute in 1897, an attorney and newspaper
editor published stories critical of a trial judge just a few weeks
before he was up for reelection.151 The judge initiated constructive
contempt proceedings, summoned the attorney and editor to court,
and compelled them to admit publication and repeat the
allegations.152 He then stayed the constructive contempt proceedings
and immediately held them in direct contempt for statements made in
open court.153 This sequence of events suggests that the trial judge
knew the constructive contempt charges were tenuous and thus
orchestrated a more easily punishable direct contempt. On appeal,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that the contempt
power is inherent in the very nature of a court, has been so
recognized “from time immemorial,” and cannot legitimately be
eliminated (or severely impaired) by statute, but it held that when
extended to commentary on already concluded cases, the power
unduly trenches on constitutional FoE values. The court held further
that such deprivations of liberty are particularly dangerous in the
context
of
judicial
elections:
Had [the judge] been a candidate for any other office, it would not be
contended by any one that the publications in question would afford
ground for any other legal action than an action for libel in the regular
course of law . . . Truly, it must be a grievous and weighty necessity
which will justify so arbitrary a proceeding, whereby a candidate for
office becomes the accuser, judge, and jury, and may within a few hours
summarily punish his critic by imprisonment. . . . If there can be any more
effectual way to gag the press, and subvert freedom of speech, we do not
know
where
to
find
it.154

Our focus here is on constitutional free expression holdings, but
150. Briggs v. Garret, 2 A. 513, 523 (Pa. 1886).
151. See State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Circuit Court of Eau Claire Cty., 72 N.W.
193, 193 (Wis. 1897) (noting that the criticisms of the judge concerned cases and
proceedings which had already been decided).
152. Id. at 197.
153. Id. at 193.
154. Id. at 196.
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state supreme courts sometimes reached similar results via statutory
reasoning. For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
“when the language used in an article is not per se libelous, and only
becomes so and made to apply to the court by the use of innuendoes,
and if fairly susceptible of an innocent meaning so far as any
reflection upon the court is concerned,” judges must accept the
innocent meaning wherever the speaker plead an innocent intent.155
The court also noted that the commentary at issue appeared to be on
past rather than pending cases.156 The New Mexico and Missouri
Supreme Courts likewise limited the application of contempt powers
where the offending language was ambiguous, though, in the latter
case, the holding appeared to rest in part on background
constitutional FoE principles.157
At the federal level, SCOTUS sometimes also reversed contempt
holdings on statutory grounds, and did so long before coming around
on the constitutional issue in Bridges. In Ex parte Robinson (1873),
for example, Justice Stephen Field held that federal courts have
inherent contempt powers, but that Congress is free to limit those
powers (at least for the inferior courts), and he reversed a contempt
holding as inconsistent with the 1831 Act.158 But the most notable
development on this front was a dissenting opinion from Justice
Holmes in the Toledo Newspaper case. Writing more than a year
before his celebrated dissent in Abrams v. United States (1919),
Holmes raised statutory objections to the scope of contempt powers
being exercised in federal court, and the opinion suggests that he had
begun to reconsider the narrow vision of the First Amendment that
155. Percival v. State, 64 N.W. 221, 222 (Neb. 1895).
156. Id. at 223.
157. See State v. New Mexico Printing Co., 177 P. 751, 755 (N.M. 1918)
(holding that the power to punish for contempt only applies to attacks upon a judge
which obstruct the administration of justice); see also State ex rel. Pulitzer Publ’g
Co. v. Coleman, 152 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Mo. 1941) (holding that publications do not
constitute punishable contempt because it is not necessary to protect the proper
functioning of the court); cf. Boorde v. Commonwealth, 114 S.E. 731 (Va. 1922)
(admitting that the language was open to interpretation and deferring to the lower
court’s judgment, while also rejecting a constitutional freedom of expression
claim).
158. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 506 (1873) (stating that the courts were
created by Congress and the power to punish for contempts can be limited by acts
of Congress).
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he endorsed in Patterson.159
The Toledo case involved newspaper coverage of legal disputes
between a railway company and the local government. When the
company’s franchise expired and the parties were unable to reach a
new agreement, the city unilaterally imposed low fares. This decision
led to multiple legal challenges filed by the company and its
creditors. In this context, the Toledo News-Bee “began publications
adverse to the rights asserted against the city by the creditors and the
railway company and in no uncertain terms avouched the right of the
city to have enacted the ordinance which the suits assailed.” 160 The
newspaper’s articles grew more vociferous over time, and in the
view of the Supreme Court, at least indirectly called into question
“the duty and power of the [trial] court and its right to afford any
relief in the matters before it.” 161 On the basis of these publications,
the trial judge held the newspaper company and its editor in
contempt, imposing a “nominal” fine on the editor and a “very
substantial” one on the company.162 SCOTUS affirmed.163
In dissent, Holmes began by observing that it is fundamentally
“contrary . . . to our practice and ways of thinking for the same
person to be accuser and sole judge in a matter which, if he be
sensitive, may involve strong personal feeling.”164 As such, judicial
contempt powers may legitimately be directed “only to the present
protection of the Court from actual interference, and not to
postponed retribution for lack of respect for its dignity.” 165 In
Holmes’s view, “a judge of the United States is expected to be a man
of ordinary firmness of character, and I find it impossible to believe
that such a judge could have found in anything that was printed even
a tendency to prevent his performing his sworn duty. I am not
considering whether there was a technical contempt at common law
159. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment protects persuasive speech, even
that which might persuade a change of government or constitute sedition).
160. Toledo Newspaper Co., 247 U.S. at 412.
161. Id. at 413.
162. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 237 F. 986, 988 (6th Cir. 1916).
163. Toledo Newspaper Co., 247 U.S. at 422.
164. Id. at 423.
165. Id. at 423.
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but whether what was done falls within the words of an act intended
and admitted to limit the power of the Courts [i.e., the 1831 contempt
statute].”166
In a subsequent treatment in the Harvard Law Review, Felix
Frankfurter and James M. Landis likewise argued that the Toledo
Newspaper majority had misread the 1831 Act, and they noted that
several lower federal courts had followed SCOTUS’s lead in
effectively erasing the Act from the statute books.167 On the statutory
issue, Professor Frankfurter’s view was that the federal courts should
abide by this legitimate statutory limitation on their contempt
powers, and in April 1941, now-Justice Frankfurter joined an opinion
by Justice Douglas writing this view into law.168 On the
constitutional issue, Frankfurter’s view took shape later that year,
when he argued that judicial punishment of constructive contempts
did not raise constitutional free expression concerns.169 But this
argument was made in dissent, as Justice Black wrote for a bare
majority in reversing the contempt holdings in Bridges v.
California.170
In Bridges, the Court vacated contempt citations that a trial judge
had issued against both radical union leader Harry Bridges and the
anti-union Los Angeles Times.171 While a major union decision was
166. Id. at 423-24; see also Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 280-82 (1923)
(Holmes, J. dissenting) (arguing that a judge’s power to punish contempts applies
to actions committed in the presence of the court or which obstruct the
administration of justice).
167. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 26, at 1037-38 (noting that claims of
the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt effectively overwrote the Act
of 1831).
168. See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 50 (1941) (holding that the broad
interpretation of the power to punish contempts was a recent invention, and the
focus should be on statutory limitations). But see Toledo Newspaper Co., 247 U.S.
at 418-19 (holding that statutes on the contempt power only demarcated the powers
and limitations already granted by the Constitution).
169. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 259 (1941) (arguing that the public
interest in judicial impartiality and decorum overrode the public interest in freedom
of expression).
170. See id. (holding that the statements punished for contempt were not an
“imminent peril to the orderly administration of justice” and so could not constitute
contempts).
171. See id. at 278 (holding that the utterance did not tend to interfere with the
administration of justice and should not constitute contempts of court).
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pending, Bridges sent a telegram to the Secretary of Labor implying
that his union would call a strike in the event of an adverse
decision.172 The L.A. Times published editorials calling for conviction
of union activists in a variety of cases.173 Overriding the state
statutory limitations on the contempt power, the California Supreme
Court treated both sets of statements as commentary on pending
cases with the intent to affect the administration of justice.174
Drawing on his strongly held view that the First Amendment had
marked a break with English common law regarding speech and
press, Black argued that the common law history of the contempt
power in England was irrelevant in the United States. 175 Following
Justice Louis Brandeis’s opinion in Whitney v. California (1927),
Black significantly tightened the existing clear-and-present-danger
test, holding that “the substantive evil must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished.”176 He acknowledged that ensuring fair trials was an
important government interest, but was not persuaded that any of the
anti-judicial speech acts here had threatened that interest.177 With
regard to the L.A. Times contempt, Black noted that the paper’s antiunion “militancy” was well-known and could hardly have surprised
an experienced Los Angeles judge. Regarding one of the editorials at
issue, even read in the harshest light, it “did no more than threaten
future adverse criticism which was reasonably to be expected
anyway in the event of a lenient disposition of the pending case.”178
As for the Bridges telegram, at most it threatened to call a legal
strike, something the trial judge likely anticipated anyway, and “[i]f
he was not intimidated by the facts themselves, we do not believe
172. Bridges v. Super. Ct., 94 P.2d at 985.
173. Times-Mirror Co. v. Super. Ct., 98 P.2d 1029, 1031 (Cal. 1940).
174. See id. at 1032 (holding that whether commentary on a pending case
constitutes contempt depends on whether it has a “reasonable tendency to interfere
with the orderly administration of justice”).
175. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 264-65 (“Ratified as it was while the
memory of many oppressive English restrictions on the enumerated liberties was
still fresh, the First Amendment cannot reasonably be taken as approving prevalent
English practices.”).
176. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927).
177. See id. at 375-76 (citing free speech and public discussion and criticism as
political duties of Americans and vital to the American experience).
178. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 198-99.
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that the most explicit statement of them could have sidetracked the
court of justice.”179 In sum, and echoing the Illinois Supreme Court’s
holding in Stuart almost 100 years earlier, Black observed that:
[t]he assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding
judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of
American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak
one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name
of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender
resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance
respect.180

Black’s opinion in Bridges radically altered the ability of United
States courts to punish critics, though not without some initial
resistance. Some state courts responded by criticizing the decision
even while adhering to it.181 Others sought to resist the new rule more
directly. In a 1945 holding, for example, the Florida Supreme Court
complained that “it was not until 1925 that anyone dreamed that the
Federal Constitution had anything to do with the punishment for
contempt under state law. . . . The States had been exercising the
power to punish for contempt for more than a hundred years and we
find nothing in the Bridges case indicating a purpose to supersede
state law and decisions on the question or to require state courts to
conform to Federal pattern.”182 The case involved a contempt holding
against the associate editor and publisher of the Miami Herald,
which had published two editorials and a cartoon critical of the state
circuit court. The first editorial, entitled “Courts Are Established -FOR THE PEOPLE,” alleged that judges were impeding the State
Attorney (the instrument of the people) from prosecuting alleged
bookmakers operating out of the local Tepee Club. 183 The editorial
179. Id. at 278.
180. Id. at 270-71.
181. See Graham v. Jones, 7 So. 2d 688, 694 (La. 1942) (noting that the
newspaper editorials at issue went “far beyond fair and reasonable criticism” of a
recent judicial decision and that they clearly amounted to constructive contempts at
the time they were published, but that the Bridges decision had changed the
constitutional rule while the action was pending).
182. Pennekamp v. Florida, 22 So. 2d 875, 883 (Fla. 1945).
183. See id. at 878 (noting the paper’s claims that the ease with which the
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was accompanied by a cartoon later described by SCOTUS as
follows: “It caricatured a court by a robed compliant figure as a
judge on the bench tossing aside formal charges to hand a document,
marked ‘Defendant dismissed,’ to a powerful figure close at his left
arm and of an intentionally drawn criminal type. At the right of the
bench, a futile individual, labeled ‘Public Interest’ vainly protests.”184
In upholding the contempt judgment, the Florida Court attempted to
limit Bridges to its facts—either because the California legislature
had not affirmatively granted judicial contempt powers or because
nothing in the California publications amounted to an attack on the
integrity of the courts—but SCOTUS reversed in Pennekamp v.
Florida (1946).185
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals likewise tried to narrow the
reach of the Bridges holding, reading it as protecting only
publications “which do[] nothing more than threaten adverse
criticism of a judge.”186 The Texas case involved contempt
convictions of a publisher, an editorial writer, and a reporter
associated with two newspapers in Corpus Christi, Texas that had
reported critically on an ongoing civil trial. The civil trial centered on
whether one Mr. Mayes (who at the time was serving active duty in
the military) had forfeited a leased property for not paying rent. The
jury initially returned a verdict for Mayes, but the trial judge
repeatedly refused to accept it. The jury eventually complied by
returning a verdict against Mayes, but indicated that it did so under
compulsion. 187 Following this judgment, and while Mayes’s motion
for a new trial was pending, the local press criticized the trial judge’s

bookmakers were protected by technical safeguards implied the court was helping
them subvert justice).
184. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 337-39 (1946); see also Pennekamp
v. Florida, 22 So. 2d at 878-79 (noting a second editorial, entitled “Why People
Wonder,” concerned “gumming up” of the prosecution of a “padlock case” at the
Brook Club).
185. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. at 350 (holding that the threat to
judicial administration was not clear or immediate enough to justify restricting free
expression and comment on the courts).
186. Ex parte Craig, 193 S.W.2d 178, 187 (Tex. Crim. 1946), rev’d, 331 U.S.
367 (1947).
187. See id. at 180 (noting that the judge instructed the jury to find for Jackson
and the jury waited until the following day to finally find as instructed).
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behavior as “arbitrary action” and a “travesty on justice.”188 The state
Court of Criminal Appeals read these articles as not just adverse
criticism but an effort “to force, compel, and coerce [the trial
judge] . . . to grant Mayes a new trial.”189 The state court upheld the
contempt, but SCOTUS reversed in Craig v. Harney (1947), with
Justice Frank Murphy stating the issue most plainly in a brief
concurring opinion: “the Constitution forbids a judge from
summarily punishing a newspaper editor for printing an unjust attack
upon him or his method of dispensing justice. The only possible
exception is in the rare instance where the attack might reasonably
cause a real impediment to the administration of justice.”190
Collectively, Bridges, Pennekamp, and Craig made clear that
public commentary on courts was now constitutionally protected so
long as it did not tend immediately to interfere with the
administration of justice. Put another way, maintaining respect for
the judiciary was no longer a legitimate justification for infringing on
free expression. Protecting the administration of justice still was such
a justification, but SCOTUS indicated that strong proof of
interference would be required before allowing suppression of antijudicial speech.191 Still, some state courts tried to exploit whatever
opening remained. In Weston v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Va.
1953), the Virginia Supreme Court ruled in favor of a speech claim
brought by a pastor whose sermon had criticized a local judge for a
decision disqualifying certain federal employees from holding
county office.192 Though the state court endorsed the free expression
claim here, it nonetheless indicated less-than-enthusiastic support for
Bridges:
We are not impressed with the argument that because of the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech and press the State is without power to
188. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 369 (1947).
189. Ex parte Craig, 193 S.W.2d at 188.
190. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. at 383.
191. See id. at 383 (stating that the First Amendment outlaws suppression of
judicial criticism using the law of contempts because it risks judges suppressing
not only unfair criticism but all criticism).
192. See Weston v. Virginia, 77 S.E.2d 405, 410 (Va. 1953) (holding that the
speech was “border line,” but did not constitute contempt because it did not
endanger the administration of justice, bring the judge into disrepute, or destroy the
confidence of the people in the administration of justice).
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punish in a contempt proceeding unwarranted and improper criticism of
judicial conduct in litigation which has been terminated, but must resort to
a criminal libel proceeding for that purpose. We are of opinion that false
and libelous utterances as to a judge’s conduct of an ended case may or
may not be punishable contempt, depending upon whether such utterances
present a clear and present danger to the administration of justice.193

Similarly (but this time ruling against the free expression
claimant), in Sarner v. Sarner, a unanimous Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that “[t]he right of free speech is always subject to
subsequently applicable sanctions for abuse of the right, and one of
these is a contempt citation for contemptuous remarks to a judge in a
courtroom.”194 In support, the opinion cited a prior state court
holding emphasizing that Bridges, Pennekamp, and Craig were
concerned with constructive contempts by the press rather than
comments within the courtroom itself.195 Even on the Supreme Court,
justices remained attentive to protecting the administration of justice
against undue interference. When the civil rights movement led to
repeated conflicts between African American demonstrators and
southern law enforcement officials, the Court repeatedly intervened
on the side of free expression for the protestors, but even in this
context, the Court drew the line at picketing of courthouses.196 In
193. Id. at 409-10.
194. Sarner v. Sarner, 147 A.2d 244, 246 (N.J. 1959).
195. See New Jersey v. Gussman, 112 A.2d 565, 568 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1955) (noting that cases dealing with statements from the press grapple with the
public interest of a free market of ideas and allowing free expression to find the
truth).
196. When civil rights demonstrators in Baton Rouge, Louisiana protested the
arrest of 23 fellow demonstrators by marching to and then picketing the local
courthouse where those demonstrators were jailed, they were convicted of
disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and violating a state statute
prohibiting “pickets or parades in or near” a state courthouse, “with the intent of
interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice.” See Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 549, 559 (1965) (reversing first two convictions and
holding that the courthouse picketing statute did not violate the First Amendment;
the Court reversed these convictions as well, on due process grounds, but it did so
by a 5-4 vote); Harry Kalven Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 U. CHI. L. SCH. CHI. UNBOUND 1, 10 (1965) (noting at the time
that the Cox opinions indicated that “[a]t one extreme, it is clear that this kind of
use of public streets and places cannot be summarily suppressed as a breach of the
peace . . . [but a]t the other extreme is the unequivocal clarity of the point that no
matter who you are or what your grievance, you cannot picket the courthouse”);
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sum, all judges are likely to be aware of the potential threat to the
administration of justice posed by unbridled free expression—even
those who serve on the most speech-protective constitutional court in
the world, during one of its most speech-protective periods, acting in
a political context in which it had repeatedly demonstrated its
commitment to free speech.197 But only some judges, acting in some
places, times, and contexts, are likely to recognize that subjecting
their own institutions to free and open debate is an imperative of
democratic governance that may outweigh these concerns for judicial
order. Our focus in the remainder of this paper is on when and where
non-U.S. judges have followed their U.S. counterparts in reaching
this conclusion.

THE LESSON OF THE U.S. CASES
Freedom of expression is a near-universal commitment of written
constitutionalism and international human rights law. But most
courts outside the United States have read this commitment more
narrowly than their U.S. counterparts, and some of these courts have
declined to extend this commitment to anti-judicial speech acts.198
For these courts, the lesson of the pre-Bridges state cases in the U.S.
may be instructive. After all, before Bridges settled the question,
U.S. state high courts spent a century and a half trying to develop a
workable distinction between legitimate public commentary on
judicial performance and illegitimate contempt of court. The lesson
of these efforts is that the use of contempt powers against out-ofcourt speech acts tends to extend, in practice, significantly beyond
see also Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting the D.C.
Circuit’s 2015 holding rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the prohibition of
demonstrations on the elevated plaza in front of the Supreme Court’s main
entrance).
197. For instances in which the Court intervened in favor of free expression for
civil rights advocates, see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285, 292
(1964), Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 227-28, 242 (1964), and Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375, 375 (1962), the latter of which reversed a contempt holding against
an elected sheriff who had criticized a local judge’s efforts to intimidate African
American voters.
198. See, e.g., In re Chinamasa, [2000] 12 BCLR 1294, 1298 (Zim.)
(highlighting the United States outcry when three Americans were sentenced to six
months imprisonment and manual labor on one count, twenty-one months
imprisonment and manual labor on the second count).
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whatever speech restrictions would be necessary to prevent concrete
threats to the administration of justice. Indeed, judges have
repeatedly used such powers to silence dissenting speech.
Consider several attempts at the necessary line-drawing. One
possible line (the so-called “American rule”) is that public
commentary on pending cases might be regulated, but public
commentary on past cases should be full and free. 199 Just prior to
Bridges, for example, the Missouri Supreme Court observed that
“[t]he great weight of judicial authority now supports the proposition
that a publication, however scandalous concerning a case which has
been closed, is not punishable as a contempt.”200 As Table 1
indicates, we have identified a total of 30 state high court decisions
prior to Bridges that ruled on constitutional FoE challenges to
contempt holdings. (29 of these cases involved speech acts directly
criticizing judges; 1 involved published criticism of the members of a
grand jury.) The state high courts rejected the FoE challenge in 23 of
these 30 cases, and in 21 of those 23, the court characterized the
speech act as commentary on a pending case. From this angle, the socalled American rule may look like a plausible candidate for
distinguishing between punishable and protected speech.

200

See State ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Coleman, 152 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Mo. 1941)
(contrasting pending cases, which cannot be stopped to swear in another jury, with
closed cases, where similar concerns regarding publications covering the case are
not applicable).
200. Id.
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Table 1: Pre-Bridges State High Court Decisions Addressing
Constitutional FoE Challenges to Contempt Holdings for
Commentary on Pending Cases
Respublica v. Oswald (Pa. 1788)
Respublica v. Passmore (Pa. 1802)
Stuart v. People (Ill. 1842)
Ex parte Hickey (Miss. 1844)
People v. Wilson (Ill. 1872)
Cooper v. People (Colo. 1889)
People v. Stapleton (Colo. 1893)
Haskell v. Faulds (Mont. 1895)
State v. Tugwell (Wash. 1898)
State v. Rosewater (Neb. 1900)
Crow v. Shepherd (Mo. 1903)
AG v. News Times [Patterson] (Colo. 1906)
In re Thatcher (Ohio 1909)
McDougall v. Sheridan (Idaho 1913)
In re Hayes (Fla. 1916)
Boorde v. Commonwealth (Va. 1922)
Dale v. State (Ind. 1926)
State v. Lovell (Neb. 1929)
In re Shuler (Cal. 1930)
In re The San Francisco Chronicle (Cal. 1934)
In re Nelson (Mont. 1936)
Bridges v. Superior Court (Cal. 1939)
Times-Mirror v. Superior (Cal. 1940)

Commentary on Concluded Cases
State v. Morrill (Ark. 1855)
Storey v. People (Ill. 1875)
Ex parte Steinman and Hensel (Pa. 1880)
Atty Gen v. Circuit Court (Wis. 1897)
Burdett v. Commonwealth (Va. 1904)
Sullens v. State (Miss. 1941)
Pulitzer Pub v. Coleman (Mo. 1941)

Commentary on Pending or Concluded Judicial Decisions (N=30).
Note: If a state high court opinion characterized the speech act as
commentary on a pending case, the holding appears in the left-hand
column here. Boldface indicates pro-FoE decision.
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On closer inspection, however, the American rule looks less
attractive for two distinct reasons. First, some judges exercising
contempt powers in expansive ways appear to think that there is no
such thing as a concluded case. In table 2, we have recoded the cases
from table 1 to reflect whether the commentary at issue was on a
judicial action that was functionally concluded, even if there
technically remained a possibility of rehearing. Here, just 14 of the
23 anti-FoE holdings involved commentary on pending cases, with
the other 9 featuring commentary on cases that had already been
decided. Second, as the facts of Stuart, Hickey, Bridges, Craig, and
the case leading to Judge Peck’s impeachment all make clear, public
commentary on pending cases is sometimes justified. In People v.
Stapleton (Colo. 1893), the newspaper commentary at issue implied
that a court had been bribed to release a group of convicted criminals
on bail pending appeal and then had delayed hearing the appeal for
more than three years. 201 Everyone acknowledged that the appeals
remained pending at the time of the published commentary, but it
was precisely this fact that made the judicial actions a matter of
public concern. As Justice Black put it in Bridges, a blanket rule
prohibiting commentary on pending cases would mean that “anyone
who might wish to give public expression to his views on a pending
case involving no matter what problem of public interest, just at the
time his audience would be most receptive, would be as effectively
discouraged as if a deliberate statutory scheme of censorship had
been adopted.” 202 After all, cases often remain technically pending in
U.S. courts for “months or even years rather than days or weeks,” in
which case blanket prohibitions on discussion of pending cases could
impose severe limits on free expression.203

201. See People ex rel. Connor v. Stapleton, 33 P. 167, 167 (Colo. 1893)
(highlighting how a lengthy article discussing the specifics of the alleged bribery
impacted the perspective of the Court).
202. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 269.
203. Id.
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Table 2: Pre-Bridges State High Court Decisions Addressing
Constitutional FoE Challenges to Contempt Holdings for
Commentary on Pending or Concluded Judicial Decisions, recoded
by authors (N=30).
Commentary on Pending Cases
Respublica v. Oswald (Pa. 1788)
Respublica v. Passmore (Pa. 1802)
Stuart v. People (Ill. 1842)
Ex parte Hickey (Miss. 1844)
People v. Wilson (Ill. 1872)
Cooper v. People (Colo. 1889)
People v. Stapleton (Colo. 1893)
State v. Rosewater (Neb. 1900)
In re Thatcher (Ohio 1909)
In re Hayes (Fla. 1916)
Dale v. State (Ind. 1926)
State v. Lovell (Neb. 1929)
In re Shuler (Cal. 1930)
In re The San Francisco Chronicle
(Cal. 1934)
Bridges v. Superior Court (Cal. 1939)
Times-Mirror v. Superior (Cal. 1940)

Commentary on Concluded Cases
State v. Morrill (Ark. 1855)
Storey v. People (Ill. 1875)
Ex parte Steinman and Hensel (Pa.
1880)
Haskell v. Faulds (Mont. 1895)
Atty Gen v. Circuit Court (Wis. 1897)
State v. Tugwell (Wash. 1898)
Crow v. Shepherd (Mo. 1903)
Burdett v. Commonwealth (Va. 1904)
AG v. News Times [Patterson] (Colo.
1906)
McDougall v. Sheridan (Ida. 1913)
Boorde v. Commonwealth (Va. 1922)
In re Nelson (Mont. 1936)
Sullens v. State (Miss. 1941)
Pulitzer Pub v. Coleman (Mo. 1941)

Note: If state high court characterized the speech act as commentary
on a pending case, but the case at issue had in fact functionally
concluded, the decision has been moved from the left- to the righthand column here. Boldface indicates pro-FoE decision.

A second line often articulated by judges themselves, particularly
English judges, is that public commentary on courts should be free,
so long as it does not question judicial motives. As table 3 illustrates,
when state high courts read the commentary at issue as questioning
judicial motives, they ruled in favor of the FoE claim in just 17.4%
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of the cases; when they did not read the commentary as questioning
judicial motives, they ruled in favor of the FoE claim in 42.9% of the
cases. All told, in the pre-Bridges case law from state high courts, 19
of the 23 anti-FoE holdings involved commentary that was read as
questioning judicial motives. As such, this line may help explain the
pattern of U.S. state holdings even better than the American rule. But
again, the normative problem remains. As Harold Laski pointed out
in 1928, “it is clear enough that there are cases in which such a
charge [of improper judicial motives] should be made without any
penalty of any kind.”204 As even judges themselves have sometimes
recognized, “ignorant and corrupt men may secure places upon the
bench. Under our form of government judges are elected or at least
hold their places subject to the approval of the people at an election.
Therefore, the judge cannot be immune from criticism. The people
who must pass upon his continuance in office have a right to be
informed of his weakness, venality, or inefficiency.”205 In other
words, when judges do act on behalf of illegitimate motives, it is not
the public discussion of such corrupt or partisan decisions but the
decisions themselves that are the threat to the rule of law. Indeed, the
public discussion might reasonably be thought to advance the
administration of justice by calling attention to ways in which it is
currently falling short of our principles.

204. Harold J. Laski, Procedure for Constructive Contempt in England, 41
HARV. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1928) (emphasis added).
205. State ex rel. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Coleman, 152 S.W.2d at 648.
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Table 3: Pre-Bridges State High Court Decisions Addressing
Constitutional FoE Challenges to Contempt Holdings for
Commentary that Questions or Does not Question Judicial Motives
(N=30).
Commentary that Questions Judicial
Motives
Respublica v. Oswald (Pa. 1788)
Respublica v. Passmore (Pa. 1802)
Ex parte Hickey (Miss. 1844)
State v. Morrill (Ark. 1855)
People v. Wilson (Ill. 1872)
Ex parte Steinman and Hensel (Pa.
1880)
Cooper v. People (Colo. 1889)
People v. Stapleton (Colo. 1893)
Haskell v. Faulds (Mont. 1895)
Atty Gen v. Circuit Court (Wis. 1897)
State v. Tugwell (Wash. 1898)
State v. Rosewater (Neb. 1900)
Crow v. Shepherd (Mo. 1903)
Burdett v. Commonwealth (Va. 1904)
AG v. News Times [Patterson] (Colo.
1906)
In re Thatcher (Ohio 1909)
McDougall v. Sheridan (Idaho 1913)
In re Hayes (Fla. 1916)
Boorde v. Commonwealth (Va. 1922)
Dale v. State (Ind. 1926)
State v. Lovell (Neb. 1929)
In re Shuler (Cal. 1930)
Pulitzer Pub v. Coleman (Mo. 1941)

Commentary that Does Not Question
Judicial Motives
Stuart v. People (Ill. 1842)
Storey v. People (Ill. 1875)
In re The San Francisco Chronicle
(Cal. 1934)
In re Nelson (Mont. 1936)
Bridges v. Superior Court (Cal. 1939)
Times-Mirror v. Superior (Cal. 1940)
Sullens v. State (Miss. 1941)

Note: Boldface indicates pro-FoE decision.
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Yet a third possibility is a sharp distinction between critical
comments made in court and those made out of court. This
distinction is the principal line drawn by the state and federal statutes
that sought to rein in contempt powers in U.S. courts, and if
nineteenth-century courts had adhered to it, we would expect to see
anti-speech holdings in cases involving in-court commentary or
perhaps no such holdings at all, if claimants avoided appeals on an
issue that seemed unwinnable. And indeed, none of the 30 preBridges constitutional holdings from state high courts that we have
identified involved in-court speech acts. But we would also expect to
see a consistent pattern of pro-FoE decisions in cases involving outof-court speech acts, and this expectation does not hold. Put another
way, the line between in-court and out-of-court commentary does no
work in making sense of the pattern of pre-Bridges state high court
decisions, as these decisions all involve out-of-court speech acts,
many of which were found to be constitutionally protected and many
others which were not.

ANTI-JUDICIAL SPEECH IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Judicial contempt powers are sometimes used against relatively
powerful actors (like government ministers) who systematically seek
to undermine judicial authority, in which case any damage to free
expression may be outweighed by the threat to the rule of law.
Consider the case of In re Chinamasa (Zimbabwe 2000). 206 In 1999,
three American citizens claiming to be Pentecostal Church
missionaries were convicted by a Zimbabwe court for smuggling
weapons and munitions from the Democratic Republic of Congo to
Zimbabwe.207 Following the convictions, the trial judge effectively
reduced the sentence to six months for each defendant.208 Attorney
General Patrick Chinamasa then gave a statement to the Herald
206. In re: Chinamasa, 12 BCLR at 1294.
207. See Neely Tucker, Zimbabwe Cuts Terms for U.S. Trio Indiana
Missionaries are Held on Gun Charges, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 14,
1999, at 4A (noting that the American missionaries involved in this case had been
commuting between Harare International Airport and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo).
208. In re: Chinamasa, 12 BCLR at 1298 (noting that although the men were
charged with terrorism and espionage, they were convicted of possession of illegal
weapons).
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newspaper, accusing the judge of having “trivialised the crimes” and
opining that “the leniency of the sentences constitutes a betrayal of
all civilised and acceptable notions of justice and of Zimbabwe’s
sovereign interests.”209 The Herald article concluded with the
Attorney General’s observation that “[a]ll these developments erode
the office’s confidence in the administration of criminal justice.”210
These statements were made by an agent of what was at the time an
increasingly authoritarian state, who was himself actively involved in
that state’s escalating attacks on judicial independence.211 The trial
judge responded by initiating contempt proceedings, and
Chinamasa’s counsel responded in turn by requesting that the
question whether common law contempt powers were compatible
with Zimbabwe’s constitutional guarantee of free expression be
referred to the Supreme Court. 212 In a unanimous decision, the
Zimbabwe Supreme Court allowed the contempt charges to proceed.
Chief Justice Anthony Gubbay’s opinion surveyed the state of
contempt law in other common-law jurisdictions, finding it to be
alive and well rather than a dead letter. 213 He indicated strong
support for free expression, but rejected the U.S. clear-and-presentdanger standard, noting that Art. 20 of the 1980 Constitution
authorized limitations on this freedom to “maintain[] the authority
and independence of the courts,” so long as those limitations were

209. Id. at 1295.
210. Id. at 1299.
211. See David Blair, Mugabe Piles Pressure on Judges to Go, TELEGRAPH
(Feb.
10,
2001),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/1322059/Mugabe-pilespressure-on-judges-to-go.html (highlighting the pressure Justice McNally, the one
remaining white male on the Supreme Court, faced from Mr. Chinamasa informing
him that he should remove himself from the Court); see also MICHAEL BRATTON,
POWER POLITICS IN ZIMBABWE 2, 8 (2014) (noting President Mugabe’s
concentrated authority in the presidency and resulting authority over political
decisions); Rachel L. Swarns, Zimbabwe’s Judges are Feeling Mugabe’s Wrath,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/04/world/zimbabwes-judges-are-feeling-mugabe-s-wrath.html (noting that in December 2000
government-backed militants threatened to remove the judges by force if they did
not resign or revise their rulings).
212. In re: Chinamasa, 12 BCLR at 1295, 1301-02.
213. See id. at 1304 (examining whether the commentary surrounding the Court
was reasonably justified or whether it was arbitrary or excessive).

738

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:4

“reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.”214 Here, in a context
in which the governing regime was regularly ignoring court orders
and undermining the rule of law, he found that standard to have been
met.
Given this context, it is hard to argue with Chief Justice Gubbay’s
conclusion in Chinamasa, but the lesson of the English and
American cases is that contempt powers, when understood to extend
well beyond a judge’s authority to control her own courtroom, will
more often be deployed against journalists, scholars, and dissidents
who question existing political arrangements. In these cases, the
supposed threat to the rule of law may be no more than a fig leaf for
political repression. In the remainder of this paper, we assess whether
and to what degree courts outside England and the United States
have drawn a defensible line in this regard.
Freedom of expression is expressly guaranteed by 184 national
constitutions that are currently in force, but like the 1980 Zimbabwe
Constitution (which is no longer in force), 39 of these documents
provide explicit exceptions for speech that amounts to contempt of
court or otherwise harms judicial authority.215 For example, Art. 19
of the Indian Constitution guarantees “freedom of speech and
expression,” but authorizes “reasonable restrictions on the exercise
of the right . . . in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of
India, the security of the State, friendly relations with Foreign States,
public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court,
defamation or incitement to an offence” (emphasis added). 216 Some
international legal guarantees of free expression include similar
exceptions, most notably Art. 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (“ECHR”).217 Other constitutional (or constitution214. Id. at 1312.
215. CONSTITUTE: THE WORLD’S CONSTITUTIONS TO READ, SEARCH, AND
COMPARE, HTTPS://WWW.CONSTITUTEPROJECT.ORG/ (LAST VISITED MAR. 14, 2018).
216. INDIA CONST. art. 19.
217. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 1955 U.N.T.S. 230 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights] (providing in Article 10 that “[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of expression,” but that this right “may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
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like) documents include so-called limitations clauses that have been
read to authorize certain restrictions on free speech, sometimes
including restrictions necessary to guard the integrity of the
judiciary. For example, Sec. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms provides that constitutional rights are “subject . . . to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.” 218 Still other constitutional
documents include explicit prohibitions on interferences with judicial
authority that might be read in similar ways. For example, Sec. 165
of the South African Constitution provides that “[n]o person or organ
of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts” and
obligates the state to “assist and protect the courts to ensure the
independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of
the courts.”219 Even where express constitutional authorizations are
lacking, common law courts might well follow their English and
American counterparts in holding that contempt powers are inherent
to judicial institutions. And in civil law jurisdictions, courts might
entertain statutory defamation suits filed by judges themselves. In
any of the foregoing instances, constitutional courts will sometimes
confront the same conflict between free expression and judicial
authority that U.S. courts faced from Respublica v. Oswald to
Bridges v. California.220

USING THE CONTEMPT POWER TO CURTAIL
FREE EXPRESSION
Judicial contempt powers are a creature of the common law world,
and it is in such jurisdictions that the jurisprudential balancing of
judicial legitimacy and free expression is most fully developed. Even
while British courts were moving toward a more speech-protective
stance in England, however, they repeatedly made clear that this
of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary” (emphasis added)).
218. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 1 (U.K.).
219. S. AFR. CONST. § 165, 1996.
220. See Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319 (1788); see also supra notes 199-204
and accompanying text.

740

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:4

stance might not apply in other territories to which their jurisdiction
extended. In McLeod, the 1899 case in which the Privy Council
observed (prematurely) that the crime of scandalizing the court was
“obsolete” in England, Lord Morris indicated that the rule might be
different for courts “in small colonies, consisting principally of
coloured populations, [where] the enforcement in proper cases of
committal for contempt of Court for attacks on the Court may be
absolutely necessary to preserve in such a community the dignity of
and respect for the Court.”221 The Privy Council referenced this lessfreedom-for-non-white-colonies argument as late as 1936, and even
sixty years later, it was still suggesting that courts in some former
colonies needed greater protection from scandalous comments than
did English courts, though the explicit racism had by this point been
scrubbed from the argument.222 In the 1936 case, the Privy Council
simply quoted the above-noted passage from McLeod; in 1999, it
took “into account that on a small island such as Mauritius the
administration of justice is more vulnerable than in the United
Kingdom. The need for the offence of scandalising the court on a
small island is greater.”223 Despite the colonialist overtones, other
common-law courts have likewise noted that contempt powers might
be more necessary for less-secure judiciaries.224
Common law courts in multiple jurisdictions continued to punish
constructive contempts throughout the twentieth century, and those
221. McLeod v. St. Aubyn [1899] UKPC 51, [1899] AC 549 (PC) (appeal taken
from St. Vincent).
222. See Ambard v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 16
(PC) (appeal taken from Trinidad and Tobago); Ahnee v. Director of Public
Prosecutions [1999] UKPC 11. para. 1 (PC) (appeal taken from Mauritius); Oyiela
Litaba, Does the Offence of Contempt by Scandalising the Court Have a Valid
Place in the Law of Modern Day Australia, 8 DEAKIN L. REV. 113, 115, 117, 122
(2003).
223. Ahnee v. Director of Public Prosecutions, UKPC 11, para. at 21.
224. Note for example the Supreme Court of Malaysia’s decision in AttorneyGeneral v. Meng Kuang [1986] 1 MLJ 207. Note also the concurring opinion from
Justice Albie Sachs in State v. Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at 56 para. 71 (S.
Afr.) (“What further complicates the matter in South Africa is that the very context
of a newly developing democracy that requires the greatest openness of debate,
necessitates the existence of a judiciary with the strongest capacity to defend that
openness.”). But cf. In re: Chinamasa, 12 BCLR at 1305 (showing Chief Justice
Gubbay’s express disavowal of this argument).
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in repressive jurisdictions used these powers repressively. In
apartheid South Africa, law professor Barend van Niekerk was
charged with contempt for publishing a scholarly article in 1969
suggesting that the country’s courts applied capital punishment in a
racially discriminatory manner. 225 He was acquitted on mens rea
grounds, but the presiding judge described the article at issue as a
contempt: “if the reader accepted the views set out he could possibly
hold the judges and the administration of justice in low esteem. . . . If
the interpretation suggested be correct then the judges could no
longer be treated with due respect for they could no longer be
universally thought of as being impartial.”226 In a November 1971
protest meeting, van Niekerk denounced Section 6 of the Terrorism
Act, which authorized indefinite solitary confinement, along with the
lawyer and judges who were enforcing it.227 He was again charged
with contempt, both re-scandalizing in general and re-prejudicing the
judgment in a pending case. He was acquitted on the former count
but convicted on the later, and this conviction was upheld on
appeal.228
It is of course no surprise that judges in repressive states have
sometimes used their available powers of speech suppression in
repressive ways. More notable is that similar decisions have
continued to issue even in well-established democracies.229 Australia
does not have an express constitutional guarantee of free expression,
but in 1992, its High Court held that “the representative form of
government established by the Australian Constitution implies a
225. Contempt of Court – The Trial of Barend Van Dyk Van Niekerk, 1970
ACTA JURIDICA 77, 78 (1970).
226. JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER
293 (1978); see also John Dugard, Forward to BAREND VAN NIEKERK, THE
CLOISTERED VIRTUE: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
IN THE WESTERN WORLD x, xiii (1987) (noting that Van Niekerk became more
outspoken after the prosecution failed to silence him).
227. Dugard, supra note 227, at xiii.
228. Id. at xv; DUGARD, supra note 227, at 296.
229. In addition to the cases from Australia and India cited in the text, note also
Wong Yeung NG v. Secretary for Justice, [1999] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 293 paras. 71, 76
(C.A.), in which the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal upheld a contempt
conviction and four-month sentence for a newspaper editor who had published a
series of scurrilous articles attacking Hong Kong judges who had ruled against his
newspaper in several obscenity and copyright disputes.
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freedom of communication on political matters, where none is
actually stated.”230 This holding has developed into a fully
enforceable constitutional guarantee of freedom for political speech,
but the High Court has nonetheless allowed summary prosecution of
contempts committed out of court. In Re Colina; Ex parte Torney
(1999), for example, the Court upheld a contempt holding against
one Mr. Torney, who had repeatedly demonstrated outside the
Family Court building in Melbourne, distributing written materials
and making abusive remarks about that court’s judges. 231 Among
other things, Torney “blam[ed] the court and its judges for the deaths
of people and for instances of child abuse, describe[ed] the judges as
being ‘terrorised’ by women’s organizations, . . . claim[ed] that
‘decisions are being made on a daily basis destroying the lives of
innocent children’ . . . [and] asserted that if people knew the nature
of orders made by judges, the likely consequence would be violent
action towards the judges.”232 In a joint opinion, Chief Justice
Murray Gleeson and Justice William Gummow cited to a 1935 High
Court holding in adopting a broad definition of contempt as anything
that
has a tendency to deflect the Court from a strict and unhesitating
application of the letter of the law or, in questions of fact, from
determining them exclusively by reference to the evidence. But such
interferences may also arise from publications which tend to detract from
the authority and influence of judicial determinations, publications
calculated to impair the confidence of the people in the Court’s judgments
because the matter published aims at lowering the authority of the Court
as a whole or that of its Judges and excites misgivings as to the integrity,
propriety and impartiality brought to the exercise of the judicial office.233

230. Katharine Gelber, Reconceptualizing Counterspeech in Hate-Speech Policy
(with a Focus on Australia), in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH:
RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES 203 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar
eds., 2012); see also MICHAEL CHESTERMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIAN
LAW: A DELICATE PLANT 3 (2000) (noting that it was not until 1992 that Australia
undertook international law to guarantee the right to free speech, however this
didn’t create an enforceable right in domestic law).
231. See Re Colina; Ex parte Torney [1999] HCA 57, ¶¶ 1, 2, 105 (Austl.).
232. Id. ¶ 7.
233. Id. ¶ 2 (quoting R v. Dunbabin; Ex parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434 at
442).

2018] THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF ANTI-JUDICIAL SPEECH

743

Citing to another early-twentieth century Australian case, Gleeson
and Gummow held that the power to deal summarily with contempts
is an “inherent . . . power of self-protection or a power incidental to
the function of superintending the administration of justice.”234
Writing separately, Justice Michael Kirby remarked that “undue
attention has been paid in the cases (and in argument before this
Court) to the law and practice of summary prosecutions for contempt
in England and in the Australian colonies and States which
developed without concern for the need to consider the application
of” subsequently adopted constitutional provisions.235 Justice Kirby
did not refer here to a free expression provision (which, again, the
Australian Constitution lacks), but to the constitutional guarantee of
trial by jury. 236 Relying on this provision (Sec. 80), he would have
held that trials for contempt must now be by jury, regardless of the
pre-constitutional common law practice. 237
In India, the Supreme Court has repeatedly, across multiple
decades, rejected constitutional challenges to contempt convictions
in circumstances in which important FoE values appear to be in play.
Some of these holdings are potentially justifiable on the grounds that
the court-critic was a powerful actor who posed a genuine threat to
the administration of justice or that the commentary represented an
effort to interfere with the adjudication of a pending case. For
example, in E.M. Sankaran Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan
Nambiar (India 1970), the Court affirmed a contempt holding against
the Chief Minister of Kerala, a member of the Communist Party of
India who had voiced a Marxist critique of the courts as tools of the
ruling class, and in Bal Kishan Giri v. State of Uttar Pradesh (India
2014), it likewise did so in the case of a lawyer who had publicly
expressed concern that a sitting justice of the Allahabad High Court
would not be impartial in a pending bail hearing.238
234. Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Porter v. The King; Ex parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432 at
443).
235. Id. ¶ 101.
236. Id.
237. Re Colina; Ex parte Torney, HCA 57 ¶ 104.
238. See Namboodiripad v. Nambiar, (1970) 1 SCR 697, 697, 699, 713 (India)
(noting that the conviction was based on utterances that the appellant made at a
Press Conference); Kishan Giri v. State of U.P., (2014) 7 SCC 280, paras. 1, 22
(India) (finding that the appellant was originally sentenced to one month of
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But these justifications fall significantly short when it comes to the
Indian Supreme Court’s own contempt holding against novelist
Arundhati Roy in 2002. As with Eleazer Oswald and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court 220 years earlier, the contempt holding
here represented just one step in a long-running conflict between the
Court and a vocal critic.239 Several years earlier, Roy had published
an article entitled “The Greater Common Good,” in which she
objected to the displacement of thousands of people from their
ancestral homes by the construction of the Sarovar Reservoir Dam.
240
The article included passages criticizing a ruling of the Court that
had permitted the height of the dam to be increased.241 In October
1999, the Court ruled against the movement challenging the
construction of the dam. In its opinion, the Court also expressed
disapproval of Roy’s article, with two judges characterizing it as “a
misrepresentation of the proceedings of the court.” 242 One year later,
opponents of the dam staged a protest outside the Court, yelling
“abusive slogans against the court including slogans ascribing lack of
integrity and dishonesty to [the] institution,” as the Court later
characterized it.243 J.R. Parashar, an advocate before the Court who
objected to the anti-Court protests, filed a contempt petition against
the protesters. In response, Roy filed an affidavit with local police
officials complaining of the Court’s “disquieting inclination . . . to
silence criticism and muzzle dissent, to harass and intimidate those
who disagree with it.”244
On the basis of this affidavit, the Court held Roy in violation of
the national Contempt of Courts Act, as she “had imputed motives to
specific courts for entertaining litigation and passing orders against
imprisonment and a fine for the statements that were made).
239. See Adrienne Stone et al., The Comparative Constitutional Law of
Freedom of Expression in Asia, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ASIA
245 (Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2014) (discussing a number of other
cases from the 1970’s where the Supreme Court held that policies that restricted
the importation of newsprint were impermissible as they would affected the
circulation of the newspaper in question).
240. See Arundhati Roy, The Greater Common Good, FRIENDS OF RIVER
NARMADA (Apr. 1999), http://www.narmada.org/gcg/gcg.html.
241. Id.
242. In re: Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC 343, 346 (India).
243. Id.
244. Id.
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her. She had accused courts of harassing her as if the judiciary were
carrying out a personal vendetta against her. She had brought in
matters which were not only not pertinent to the issues to be decided
but has drawn uninformed comparisons to make statements about
this Court which do not appear to be protected by law relating to fair
criticism.” 245 Echoing eighteenth-century English and nineteenthcentury American courts, the Indian Court objected to Roy’s
“persistent and consistent attempt to malign the institution of the
judiciary,” observed that “[f]or the judiciary to perform its duties and
functions effectively and true to the spirit with which it is sacredly
entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected
and protected at all costs,” noted that the courts’ “only weapon [for
doing so] . . . is the long hand of contempt of court left in the
armoury of judicial repository which, when needed, can reach any
neck howsoever high or far away it may be,” and insisted that it “is
no defence to say that as no actual damage has been done to the
judiciary, the proceedings be dropped. The well-known proposition
of law is that it punishes the archer as soon as the arrow is shot no
matter if it misses . . . the target. The respondent is proved to have
shot the arrow, intended to damage the institution of the judiciary
and thereby weaken the faith of the public in general and if such an
attempt is not prevented, disastrous consequences are likely to follow
resulting in the destruction of rule of law.” 246 In support, the Court
quoted at length from one of its own holdings from 1978, including a
passage which had appealed to Justice Frankfurter’s and Jackson’s
dissents in Bridges and Craig v. Harney, respectively.247 The Court
acknowledged that freedom of expression was constitutionally
guaranteed, but noted that the Indian Constitution included express
textual exceptions, allowing “reasonable restrictions on the exercise
of the right . . . in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offense.”248 In sum, like English judges before them,
245. Id.
246. In re: Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC at 343.
247. Id. at 355 (citing In Re: S. Mulgaokar, 3 SCC 339 (India 1978) (stating “the
judiciary is not immune from criticism but when that criticism is based on obvious
distortion or gross mis-statement and made in a manner which is distortion or gross
mis-statement and made in a manner which is designed to lower the respect of the
judiciary and destroy public confidence in it, it cannot be ignored”).
248. Id. at 343, 352, 383.
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Indian judges have been intolerant of speech that questions judicial
impartiality.

USING FREE EXPRESSION TO CURTAIL THE
CONTEMPT POWER (AND JUDICIAL
DEFAMATION SUITS)
While constitutional courts in some common law systems have
continued to allow repressive uses of judicial contempt powers,
others have begun to recognize that such powers are limited by
constitutional FoE principles. For example, the leading Canadian
case is R. v. Kopyto (Ont. C.A. 1987), in which the Ontario Court of
Appeals relied on Sec. 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
quashing the contempt conviction of a lawyer who had publicly
criticized a judge for dismissing a case that the lawyer had filed. 249
Representing a long-time leader of the League for Socialist Action
who had lodged repeated legal complaints regarding R.C.M.P.
investigations, Harry Kopyto was quoted in the press as follows:
“This decision is a mockery of justice. It stinks to high hell. It says it
is okay to break the law and you are immune so long as someone
above you said to do it.” 250 He also noted that he and his client were
“wondering what is the point of appealing and continuing this
charade of the courts in this country which are warped in favour of
protecting the police.”251 The Ontario court held that Kopyto’s
statements were constitutionally protected speech, with two members
of the three-judge majority adopting a standard closely modeled on
the United States’ clear-and-present-danger test (holding that
scandalous comments could be punished only if the state
demonstrates an “imminent” danger to the fair administration of
justice) and the third holding that the common law offense of
scandalizing the court is inconsistent with Sec. 2(b) whether or not
the comments at issue pose an imminent danger. 252
The Kopyto holding is widely cited internationally, though it
remains unclear whether the Supreme Court of Canada endorses the
249.
250.
251.
252.

See, e.g., 62 O.R. 2d 449, 449-50 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
Id.
Id.
See id.
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full scope of the freedom to criticize judges that it recognized. Just
one year after Kopyto, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected a
constitutional FoE challenge to an injunction imposed summarily on
the picketing of courthouses, with Chief Justice Dickson’s opinion
making clear that judicial contempt powers can sometimes override
Sec. 2(b) rights.253 In 2012, the Supreme Court again issued a
decision suggesting a somewhat less speech-protective standard than
that which prevailed in Kopyto. Doré v. Barreau du Québec (2012)
involved not a contempt holding but rather a three-week suspension
of a lawyer’s license in a disciplinary proceeding, but like the Kopyto
case, it began with a lawyer harshly criticizing a judge, so the
Court’s rejection of the free expression claim here left the scope of
Canadian freedom to criticize judges somewhat unclear. 254 Writing
for a unanimous Court in Doré, Justice Rosalie Abella acknowledged
that even “robust” criticism of judges by lawyers “can be constructive,”
but held that “in the context of disciplinary hearings, such criticism will
be measured against the public’s reasonable expectations of a lawyer’s
professionalism.” In the case at hand, the lawyer’s “displeasure with
[the judge] . . . was justifiable, but the extent of the response was not.”
As such, the temporary suspension from the bar was a reasonable and
proportionate restriction on Sec. 2(b).255 Taken together, these
holdings demonstrate the Canadian Supreme Court’s continued
concern for protecting judges and judicial institutions from undue
criticism and protest.
Outside the United States, no national high courts operating in
common-law jurisdictions have protected anti-judicial speech as
fully as did the Ontario court in Kopyto, but at least one has taken a
step in this direction. In 2001, the South African Constitutional Court
acknowledged the importance of protecting judicial authority in new
democracies, but nonetheless ruled in favor of a claimant who had
253. See British Columbia Government Employees’ Union v. Attorney General
of British Columbia [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, 215 (Can.) (stating that in seeking to
answer whether freedom of expression is involved in this case it must be observed
that in any form of picketing there is at least some element of expression).
254. See Doré v. Barreau du Québec [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, 397 (Can).
255. See id. at 399-400 (noting that in the Charter context, a reasonableness
analysis focuses on proportionality and does not interfere with the Charter
guarantee any more than a statutory directive).
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been jailed for anti-judicial speech. 256 This case involved a
spokesperson for the Department of Correctional Services who had
issued a press release contending that a High Court judge had
wrongly granted bail to a prisoner.257 The spokesperson, Mr. Russell
Mamabolo, was summarily tried, convicted, and jailed for
scandalizing the court.258 On appeal, and with support from the
Freedom of Expression Institute, Mamabolo argued that the offense
of scandalizing the court by way of statements not made in court or
related to pending proceedings could no longer be recognized in light
of the 1996 Constitution’s express guarantee of freedom of
expression.259 As this question was one of first impression, the
Constitutional Court noted the long common law history of the
contempt power (including an extended quotation from Mr. Justice
Wilmot in Almon’s Case), asked whether the continued existence of
such a power was compatible with free expression in a democratic
state, and concluded that it remained an essential means for
preserving judicial authority. 260 As such, the Court held that
punishments for contempt limited freedom of expression in ways that
were “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society”
and hence were authorized under the Constitution’s Sec. 36
limitations clause. 261 But the Court went on to hold that, in light of
constitutional FoE principles, the scope of the crime of scandalizing
the court must be carefully defined, preserved only for a “narrow
category of egregious cases.”262 The Court also held that in light of
constitutional fair trial principles, contempt charges could no longer
be tried by the sort of summary procedures used at common law. In a
separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Albie Sachs
called for tightening the crime of scandalizing the court still further,
256. See State v. Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) ¶ 71 (S. Afr.).
257. See id. ¶ 4.
258. See id. ¶ 71.
259. See id. ¶ 2.
260. See State v. Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at 56 ¶ 71 (S. Afr.) (stating
in part “the arraignment of the justice of the Judges, is arraigning the King’s
justice; it is an impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in the choice of his
Judges, and excites in the minds of the people a general dissatisfaction with all
judicial determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey them”).
261. See id. ¶ 57.
262. See id. ¶¶ 45-47.
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limiting it to statements that “pose a real and direct threat to the
administration of justice.”263 Under either standard, the justices were
unanimous that Mamabolo’s statements at issue in this case “did not
in any way impair the dignity, integrity or standing of the judiciary
or of the particular judge” and hence that his conviction and sentence
should be set aside.264 In sum, the Court expressly rejected a call to
import strict, U.S.-style FoE limits on contempt powers, but it read
those powers down and required more-than-summary procedures
when using them.
In some civil law jurisdictions, constitutional courts have proven
willing to defend the freedom to criticize judges as broadly (or nearly
so) as have U.S. courts. Lacking the summary contempt powers
traditionally exercised by common-law courts, courts in these
jurisdictions have sometimes sanctioned anti-judicial speech acts
under generic defamation laws (in suits filed by or on behalf of the
impugned judges) or under statutory prohibitions on abusing judges
in particular. 265 In response, some constitutional courts have joined
SCOTUS in emphasizing the value of robust democratic debate
about judicial performance and on this basis have thrown out
convictions of anti-judicial speakers. In 2007, for example, the
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic held that the producers of
a television report accusing a named judge of “carry[ing] out
political trials” could not constitutionally be ordered to apologize to
the judge in question.266
Perhaps most notably, the German Federal Constitutional Court
has repeatedly and consistently held that the freedom of expression
extends to critical commentary about courts.267 Its first significant
263. Id. ¶ 75.
264. Id. ¶ 61.
265. See, e.g., Code Pénal [C. Pén.] [Penal Code] art. 434-24, 434-25 (Fr.)
(listing various verbal and nonverbal offences and abuses against members of the
court).
266. Nález Ústavního soudu ze dne 17.07.2007 (ÚS) [Decision of the
Constitutional Court of July 17, 2007], sp.zn. IV. ÚS 23/05 publ. in: Sbírka zákonu
(Czech) (noting that requiring the producers to apologize would be a restriction on
the freedom of speech).
267. See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 453-54 (3rd ed. 2012)
(explaining that under the Basic Law a person should be able to use abusive
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reference to this principle came in the course of declaring that judges
have free expression rights of their own to respond to published
criticism.268 In a November 1953 public appearance in Stuttgart, one
Judge Schmid delivered a speech in favor of political strikes; in the
process, he criticized the mainstream press for being economically
dependent on anti-union employers.269 The speech was subsequently
published in a trade union journal, and the weekly magazine Der
Spiegel responded with an article accusing the judge of Communist
sympathies. 270 Judge Schmid responded in turn, writing in a daily
newspaper that Der Spiegel was lying about him and comparing the
magazine’s reporting to pornography.271 Der Spiegel’s editor and
publisher won a criminal libel judgment against Judge Schmid, but
he filed a constitutional complaint, and the Constitutional Court ruled
in his favor, holding that Der Spiegel had a constitutional right to
publish the articles at issue, even if they were not well motivated, but
that the subject of the articles likewise had a constitutional right to
publish a response.272 Fifteen years later, the Constitutional Court
built on the first half of this holding in the Prison Privacy Case
(BVerfG 1976).273 Here, a criminal defendant who was jailed
pending trial had written a letter to his wife describing the presiding
judges as “prodigious clowns” who if they had any conscience would
be unable “to sleep peacefully at night.”274 One of the judges in
question ordered the letter confiscated on insult-to-judiciary and
prison-discipline grounds, but the Constitutional Court subsequently
ruled that the defendant’s Art. 5 free expression rights had been
violated.275 The Constitutional Court reaffirmed this principle in a
language, if necessary, to defend himself).
268. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 268, at 450-51 (finding that the judge’s
right to free speech had been violated because of the “constitutional importance of
the process of forming public opinion”).
269. Id. at 450.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 450-53.
273. KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 268, at 476.
274. Id.
275. Id.; BVerfG, 2 BVR 701/72, Apr. 11, 1973, http://www.servat.
unibe.ch/dfr/bv035035.html (finding that the applicant’s fundamental rights had
been violated because “interdiction between spouses [was] interfered with by the
letter’s holding on freedom of expression”).
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2014 case involving a disciplinary complaint filed by a litigant
against a judge who had ruled against him in a recent dispute. The
written complaint characterized the judgment as “fraudulent,”
“malicious,” and “shabby,” accused the judge of a “perfidious lie,”
and argued that the judge might herself commit a crime in the future.
On the basis of such language, the complainant was found guilty of
defamation, but the Constitutional Court then held that this judgment
had violated Art. 5.276

ANTI-JUDICIAL SPEECH AT THE ECTHR
Outside the United States, the only constitutional or quasiconstitutional court that has addressed the limits of anti-judicial
speech regularly enough to enable systematic analysis of the cases is
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). The ECtHR has
repeatedly held that anti-judicial speech acts are protected expression
under ECHR Art. 10, even though that article expressly authorizes
restrictions on expression that “are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of . . . maintaining
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”277 In this section, we
review all judgments issued by the ECtHR from its inception through
2015 on the merits of an Art. 10 claim involving an anti-judicial
speech act. We have identified 27 such cases, and in tables 4, 5, and
6, we have sorted them along the lines of distinction used in our
analysis of the U.S. state cases.278
276. BVerfG,
1
BvR
482/13,
Jul.
28,
2014,
http://www.bverfg.de/e/rk20140728_1bvr048213.html (noting that the judgment of
the lower courts violated the complainant’s right to freedom of expression).
277. DOMINIKA BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 7, 73-75
(Council of Europe 2017); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note
218, at 230.
278. We identified the universe of twenty-seven cases as part of a broader,
ongoing collaborative effort, funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation, to
create a Global Repository of Free Speech Jurisprudence. We also made use of
data available in Cichowski (2015). We have excluded one of these twenty-seven
cases from tables 4 and 5. Romanenko v. Russia, Application no. 11751/03
(ECtHR 2009), involved published commentary not on the judicial actions of a
court, but on a court management department’s participation in controversial
timber purchases. This fact pattern does not easily fit the lines of distinction treated
in these two tables.
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Table 4: ECtHR Holdings on Art. 10 Claims Involving Commentary
on Pending or Concluded Judicial Decisions (N=26)
Commentary on Pending Cases
Weber v. Switzerland (1990)
De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium
(1997)
Schöpfer v. Switzerland (1998)
Hrico v. Slovakia (2004)
Kyprianou v. Cyprus (2005)
Saday v. Turkey (2006)
July and Sarl Libération v. France
(2008)
Obukhova v. Russia (2009)
Kudeshkina v. Russia (2009)
1*YW+ )n !/5z,Wz sQlSSq
Lopuch v. Poland (2012)
Karpetas v. Greece (2012)
Marian Maciejewski v. Poland
(2015)
Morice v. France (2015)
Bono v. France (2015)
Kincses v. Hungary (2015)

Commentary on Concluded Cases
Barfod v. Denmark (1989)
Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria (1995)
Skalka v. Poland (2003)
Amihalachioaie v. Moldova (2004)
Kuznetsov v. Russia (2008)
Bezymyannyy v. Russia (2010)
Dumas v. France (2010)
Ungváry and Irodalom Kft. v.
Hungary (2013)
Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v.
Turkey (2014)
Peruzzi v. Italy (2015)

Note: Boldface indicates pro-FoE decision.
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Table 5: ECtHR Holdings on Art. 10 Claims Involving
Commentary that Questions or Does not Question Judicial Motives
(N=26)
Commentary that Questions Judicial
Motives
Barfod v. Denmark (1989)
Weber v. Switzerland (1990)
Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria
(ECtHR 1995)
De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium
(1997)
Schöpfer v. Switzerland (1998)
Skalka v. Poland (ECtHR 2003)
Hrico v. Slovakia (ECtHR 2004)
Kyprianou v. Cyprus (2005)
Saday v. Turkey (2006)
July and Sarl Libération v. France
(2008)
Kuznetsov v. Russia (ECtHR 2008)
Obukhova v. Russia (ECtHR 2009)
Kudeshkina v. Russia (ECtHR 2009)
Bezymyannyy v. Russia (ECtHR
2010)
Dumas v. France (2010)
1*YW+ )n !/5z,Wz sk!,hE QlSSq
Lopuch v. Poland (ECtHR 2012)
Karpetas v. Greece (2012)
Ungváry and Irodalom Kft. v.
Hungary (ECtHR 2013)
Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v.
Turkey (2014)
Marian Maciejewski v. Poland
(2015)
Morice v. France (2015)
Bono v. France (2015)

Commentary that Does Not Question
Judicial Motives
Amihalachioaie v. Moldova (2004)
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Kincses v. Hungary (2015)
Peruzzi v. Italy (2015)

Note: Boldface indicates pro-FoE decision.

Table 6: ECtHR Holdings on Art. 10 Claims Involving AntiJudicial Speech Acts Made in and out of Court (N=27)
Commentary in Court
Kyprianou v. Cyprus (2005)
Saday v. Turkey (2006)
1*YW+ )n !/5z,Wz sQlSSq
Lopuch v. Poland (2012)
Bono v. France (2015)
Kincses v. Hungary (2015)

Commentary out of Court
Barfod v. Denmark (1989)
Weber v. Switzerland (1990)
Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria (1995)
De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium (1997)
Schöpfer v. Switzerland (1998)
Skalka v. Poland (2003)
Amihalachioaie v. Moldova (2004)
Hrico v. Slovakia (2004)
Kuznetsov v. Russia (2008)
July and Sarl Libération v. France
(2008)
Obukhova v. Russia (2009)
Romanenko v. Russia (2009)
Kudeshkina v. Russia (2009)
Bezymyannyy v. Russia (2010)
Dumas v. France (2010)
Karpetas v. Greece (2012)
Ungváry and Irodalom Kft. v.
Hungary (2013)
Mustafa Erdoğan and Others v.
Turkey (2014)
Marian Maciejewski v. Poland (2015)
Morice v. France (2015)
Peruzzi v. Italy (2015)

Note: Boldface indicates pro-FoE decision.
As we argued above, none of these lines of distinction provides a
normatively adequate dividing line between protected and
unprotected speech. But even if they did do so, none of them
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provides much practical help in distinguishing between anti-judicial
speech acts that the ECtHR has protected under ECHR Art. 10 and
those that it has not. As shown in table four, the ECtHR has ruled in
favor of the Art. 10 claimant in roughly two-thirds of the claims
involving commentary on pending cases and in roughly two-thirds of
those involving commentary on concluded cases (10 of 16 and 7 of
10, respectively). As shown in Table 5, all but one of the relevant
cases involve speech acts that question judicial motives, yet the
Court has responded to these allegations of judicial corruption or
partiality in disparate ways. As shown in Table 6, the Court is
particularly likely to extend Art. 10 protection to anti-judicial speech
acts made out of court, with pro-FoE holdings in more than threequarters of such cases, but it has likewise extended such protection in
half the cases involving in-court speech acts.
Given the inadequacy of these three standards in explaining the
pattern of decisions, we turn next to a close reading of the case law
to determine whether the ECtHR has developed (and adhered to) any
alternative standard that adequately distinguishes between speech
acts that pose a genuine threat to the administration of justice and
those that merely offend judicial sensibilities. The ECtHR’s impulse
to protect anti-judicial speech under Art. 10 did not emerge right
away. In Barfod v. Denmark (ECtHR 1989) and Prager and
Oberschlick v. Austria (ECtHR 1995), the Court upheld defamation
judgments against the authors of magazine articles that criticized
recent judicial decisions and that clearly represented commentary on
matters of public concern.279 The latter case began with publication
of an article referencing nine members of the Vienna Regional
Criminal Court. Entitled “Danger! Harsh Judges!” the article
included the following passage:
They treat each accused at the outset as if he had already been convicted.
They have persons who have travelled from abroad arrested in court on
the ground that there is a danger that they will abscond. They ask people
who are unconscious after fainting whether they accept their sentence.
Protestations of innocence are greeted on their part with a mere shrug of
279. Barfod v. Denmark, App. No. 11508/85, 149 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 36
(1989); Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, App. No. 15974/90, 313 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) paras. 38-40 (1995); Schöpfer v. Switzerland, App. No. 25405/94, 1998-III
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 paras. 33-34.
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the shoulders and attract for their authors the heaviest sentence because
they have not confessed. Some Austrian criminal court judges are capable
of anything; all of them are capable of a lot: there is a pattern to all this.

280

The article also included passages regarding several individual
judges—in one instance, noting disciplinary proceedings regarding
the judge’s involvement with a prostitute and complaining about his
dismissive treatments of probation officers and unnecessarily harsh
sentencing practices. 281 The judge at issue in these passages filed a
defamation claim under Art. 111 of the Austrian Criminal Code, and
the author of the offending article was convicted and fined. 282 The
author then alleged a violation of Art. 10, but the ECtHR sided with
the Austrian state in rejecting this claim. Echoing the early English
and American treatment of such issues, the Court noted that
“[r]egard must . . . be had to the special role of the judiciary in
society. As the guarantor of justice, a fundamental value in a lawgoverned State, it must enjoy public confidence if it is to be
successful in carrying out its duties. It may therefore prove necessary
to protect such confidence against destructive attacks that are
essentially unfounded, especially in view of the fact that judges who
have been criticised are subject to a duty of discretion that precludes
them from replying.”283
Judges in most Council of Europe (CoE) member states lack
common law contempt powers, but as the Austrian case makes clear,
their reputations are often well-protected by generic defamation
laws, and they are sometimes protected by explicit statutory or
constitutional guarantees of judicial authority as well.284 Many judges
have eagerly taken up these defenses when faced with attacks on
their authority, and the ECtHR’s early treatment of such cases would
280. Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, App. No. 15974/90, para. 9.
281. Id. ¶ 11 (describing Mr. Prager’s recounts from visiting courtrooms and
interacting with individual judges).
282. Id. ¶ 12.
283. Id. ¶¶ 34, 38-39.
284. See Code Pénal [C. Pén.] [Penal Code] art. 434-24, 434-25 (Fr.) (specifying
that “abuse by words, gestures or threats, written documents or pictures” and other
non publically available material to a judge, prosecutor, or juror can result in two
years’ imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 euros).
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fit comfortably within the repressive line of holdings in nineteenthcentury U.S. courts. As such, the Barfod and Prager decisions led at
least one observer to note that the ECtHR was less protective of antijudicial speech than of other categories of expression under Art.
10.285 But the Court’s view has shifted since then, with ECtHR
judges becoming increasingly sensitive to the need to balance the
protection of judicial reputation with a strong commitment to robust
public debate on judicial performance.
Indeed, this recognition was present even on the chambers that
heard Barfod and Prager, neither of which was unanimous. In
Barfod, Judge Gölcüklü emphasized in dissent that the controversial
magazine article “involved criticism of a specific judicial system,
namely the Greenland judiciary and its composition, which, in the
applicant’s view, did not inspire public confidence.”286 Surely a
democratic society must be willing to tolerate such discussion?
Likewise in Prager, Judge Martens pointed out that:
[q]uite apart from the one-sided interpretation of [the] . . . passages on
which the impugned conclusion is based, it simply cannot be accepted
that the mere wording of a critical comment on a subject of general public
interest suffices for that comment to be classified as being made with
malicious intent to defame. That would mean that the courts would totally
disregard the author’s purpose of initiating a public discussion; that would
mean that, de facto, only the interests of the plaintiff would be taken into
consideration and would curb freedom of expression to an intolerable
degree. I recall that ‘Article 10 protects not only the substance of the ideas
and information expressed, but also the form in which they are conveyed.’
For these reasons I think that at least where a critical comment on a
subject of general interest is involved, even very exaggerated terms and
caustic descriptions do not per se justify the conclusion that there was
malicious intent to defame.287

Judge Gölcüklü dissented alone in Barfod, but Prager was issued
285. See Barfod v. Denmark, App. No. 11508/85, para. 36; Prager and
Oberschlick v. Austria, App. No. 15974/90, para. 39 (specifying that there was no
violation of the applicant’s Article 10 right to freedom of speech).
286. Barfod v. Denmark, App. No. 11508/85, para. 3 (Gölcüklü, J., dissenting).
287. Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, App. No. 15974/90, para. 15 (Martens,
J., dissenting); see generally Weber v. Switzerland, App. No. 11034/84, 12 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 508, para. 52 (1990) (finding that being convicted and sentenced was an
interference with the applicant’s right to exercise freedom of expression).
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by a 5-4 vote.
Just two years after the Prager holding, a similar case from
Belgium came out the other way. Here, a weekly magazine had
published a series of articles “criticis[ing] judges of the Antwerp
Court of Appeal at length and in virulent terms for having, in a
divorce suit, awarded custody of the children to the father,” who had
been accused by the mother of sexually abusing their children and of
requiring the family “to live according to Hitler’s principles.”288 The
impugned judges filed a defamation claim against the journalists, and
the Belgian courts ruled in the judges’ favor, but the ECtHR then
held that this judgment had violated Art. 10. The Court noted its
disapproval of “the journalists’ polemical and even aggressive tone”
and reiterated that “in a State based on the rule of law [the courts]
must enjoy public confidence [and hence] must . . . be protected from
destructive attacks that are unfounded.” But it nonetheless concluded
that the articles in question represented a legitimate contribution to
an ongoing debate on matters of public concern.289
The ECtHR subsequently elaborated on this holding in a series of
cases indicating that member states were entitled to protect judicial
reputations from abuse, but that excessive punishments imposed on
anti-judicial speech would amount to Art. 10 violations. In Skalka v.
Poland (ECtHR 2003), the Court held that an eight-month prison
sentence imposed on a prisoner who had written a letter
characterizing a judge as an “irresponsible clown”, a “little cretin”, a
“fool”, a “bully”, and “a limited individual” was so disproportionate
as to violate Art 10.290 The Court indicated explicitly that a lesser
sentence would have been upheld, but it made clear that Art. 10
imposed some limitation on defamation prosecutions for anti-judicial
speech.291 In a series of cases from various Russian regional courts
during the late 2000s, the Court likewise ruled that fines and
imprisonment imposed for defamation had gone further than
necessary in maintaining judicial authority in a democratic society.
In Kuznetsov v. Russia (ECtHR 2008), the organizer of a
288. De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, App. No. 19983/92, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
paras. 7, 21.
289. Id. paras. 37, 48.
290. Skalka v. Poland, App. No. 43425/98, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 6-10 (2003).
291. Id. at 9.
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demonstration in front of the Sverdlovsk Regional Court was fined
1000 Rubles under the Code on Administrative Offences for
distributing leaflets with “slanderous and insulting” characterizations
of the president of the court and for impeding access to the
courthouse.292 A unanimous ECtHR chamber found a violation of
ECHR Art. 11 (freedom of assembly), interpreted in light of Art.
10.293 The chamber’s opinion noted that “the purpose of the picket
was to attract public attention to the alleged dysfunction of the
judicial system in the Sverdlovsk Region. This serious matter was
undeniably part of a political debate on a matter of general and
public concern,” and the Russian authorities had not produced
sufficient reasons for restricting this debate. 294 In language
reminiscent of the standard articulated by Justice Black in Bridges,
the Court noted further that “any measures interfering with the
freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement
to violence or rejection of democratic principles – however shocking
and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to the
authorities – do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger
it.”295
In Obukhova v. Russia (ECtHR 2009), the ECtHR heard an Art.
10 challenge to a judicial injunction preventing newspaper reporting
of any material related to ongoing proceedings concerning a traffic
altercation in which a judge had been involved. 296 A unanimous
ECtHR chamber held that the prior restraint was “excessively broad
and disproportionate,” even while acknowledging that articles critical
of the judge “could indeed be damaging to Judge Baskova’s
reputation and to the authority of the judicial system.”297 Similar
reasoning was employed by a closely divided chamber in
Kudeshkina v. Russia (ECtHR 2009), a controversy arising from a
Moscow City Court judge’s criticism of the President of the Moscow
Judicial Council and Prosecutor General’s Office in connection with
292. Kuznetsov v. Russia, App. No. 10877/04, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1170, para.
17.
293. Id. para. 55.
294. Id. paras. 47-48.
295. Id. para. 45.
296. Obukhova v. Russia, App. No. 34736/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 7-8, 10, 15
(2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90468.
297. Id. para. 27.
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a high profile corruption case. 298 Judge Kudeshkina’s critical
statements, made during the course of her own election campaign to
the State Duma of the Russian Federation, led to her dismissal under
Russia’s judicial Code of Honour.299 Finding a violation of Art. 10,
the ECtHR majority noted that while Judge Kudeshkina “made the
public criticism with regard to a highly sensitive matter, notably the
conduct of various officials dealing with a large-scale corruption
case in which she was sitting as a judge,” her dismissal was
nevertheless not necessary in a democratic society because her
comments drew attention to the importance of judicial independence
and the need for public confidence in the judicial branch.300
Unanimous chambers in Romanenko v. Russia (ECtHR 2009) and
Bezymyannyy v. Russia (ECtHR 2010) continued this trend, with the
Bezymyannyy Court emphasizing that “[t]he important role . . . the
judiciary plays in a democratic society cannot . . . immunise judges
from being targets of citizens’ complaints.”301 As these cases
proceeded, even when the Court was emphasizing the excessive
punishment issue, its opinions increasingly included language
suggesting that judges should not be so insulated from, or sensitive
to, public criticism.
The Court reiterated this point in the context of academic speech
in Ungváry and Irodalom Kft. v. Hungary (ECtHR 2013), a case
arising from the May 2007 publication of a magazine article entitled
“The Genesis of a Procedure – Dialógus in Pécs.” 302 Authored by
historian Krisztián Ungváry, the article focused on the role of the
Hungarian security service and its network of informants in quelling
a 1980s student peace movement, referencing the role of a current
Constitutional Court judge in that affair. 303 The judge in question had
298. Kudeshkina v. Russia, App. No. 29492/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 13, 38, 94
(2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-91501.
299. Id. para. 34.
300. Id. para. 94.
301. Bezymyannyy v. Russia, App. No. 10941/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 40 (2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-98121; Romanenko v. Russia, App. No.
11751/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 47 (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00194843.
302. Ungváry and Irodalom Kft. v. Hungary, App. No. 64520/10, Eur. Ct. H.R.
para. 7 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-110557.
303. Id. paras. 7-8.

2018] THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF ANTI-JUDICIAL SPEECH

761

not been a state security agent, but he had served “as an official
contact” with the security agencies, and in that capacity, “he was
busy as an informant and demanding hard-line policies.”304
Following publication of the article and a Hungarian court-ordered
rectification at the Constitutional Court judge’s request, Ungváry coauthored a book-length treatment of the Communist State security
apparatus and included the original magazine article in the book.305
The Constitutional Court judge then initiated defamation proceedings
against Ungváry and his publisher, resulting in convictions and fines
for both parties.306 A closely divided ECtHR chamber ruled four to
three that Ungváry’s conviction violated Art. 10. The majority
opinion acknowledged that “courts . . . must enjoy public confidence;
and it may therefore prove necessary to protect judges from offensive
and abusive verbal attacks,” but emphasized that the statements at
issue were part of a broader scholarly discussion of public interest:
“The highest office holders, who are elected in the political process,
must accept that their past public and political conduct remains open
to constant public scrutiny. [The judge at issue] . . . was a public
figure in that he was member of the Constitutional Court at the time
when the impugned statements were made. . . . [As such,] he should
have had a higher degree of tolerance to criticism.”307
From 2004-2015, similar speech-protective decisions issued in
anti-judicial speech cases arising in Cyprus, France, Moldova,
Poland, Slovakia, and Turkey.308 During this same period, speech304. Id. para. 8.
305. Id. para. 12.
306. Id. para. 3.
307. Id. paras. 44, 64, 85.
308. See Kyprianou v. Cyprus, App. No. 73797/01, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 873; July
and Sarl Libération v. France, App. No. 20893/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-110557; Roland Dumas v. France, App. No.
34875/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-99889;
Morice v. France, App. No. 29369/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-154265; Bono v. France, App. No. 29024/11,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159607; Amihalachioaie
v.
Moldova,
App.
No.
60115/00,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2004),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61716; Marian Maciejewski v. Poland, App.
No. 34447/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-150228;
Hrico v. Slovakia, App. No. 49418/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61930; Saday v. Turkey, App. No. 32458/96,
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repressive decisions issued in cases from Croatia, Greece, Hungary,
Italy, and Poland.309 Taken collectively, two patterns are apparent in
these holdings, as indicated in table seven. In cases involving antijudicial speech acts by scholars or journalists, the ECtHR has
become consistently speech-protective; after the initial holdings in
Barfod and Prager, the ECtHR issued eight such decisions, and it
found Art. 10 violations in all of them. In cases involving antijudicial speech acts by litigators or litigants involved in recent or
ongoing judicial proceedings, results in Strasbourg have been more
mixed; the ECtHR has issued fifteen decisions on the merits of such
cases, and it found Art. 10 violations in nine of them, with no
discernable trend emerging over time. This differential treatment is
potentially justifiable on the grounds of protecting the fair
administration of justice, particularly as regards commentary on
pending cases. But it is not clear that the ECtHR has yet developed a
clear and consistent rule for distinguishing comments by lawyers and
their clients that pose a genuine threat to the rule of law from those
that do not.

Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-KOlSK( b*.,z[z k/^5Rz8
v. Turkey, App. Nos. 346/04 and 39779/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-144129 (protecting the freedom of speech over
the desire to prevent anti-judicial speech).
309. See 1*YW+ )n !/5z,Wzp #22n `5n OLIImlJp k*/n !,n hnEn sQlSSqp
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104933; Karpetas v. Greece, App. No.
6086/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-114209;
Kincses v. Hungary, App. No. 66232/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-150673; Peruzzi v. Italy, App. No. 39294/09,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-SMMIKN( :52*_X v.
Poland,
App.
No.
43587/09,
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.
(2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112467 (repressing the right to freedom of
speech in each of these holdings); see also A. v. Finland, App. No. 44998/98, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-23680 (finding that the
Article 10 claim was inadmissible in this anti-judicial speech case).

2018] THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF ANTI-JUDICIAL SPEECH

763

Table 7: Speech Context and Speech Claimants in ECtHR Holdings
on Art. 10 Claims Involving Anti-Judicial Speech Acts (N=27)
Speech
Claimant
Dissident
Scholar

Journalist

Comments
in
open
court

Written court
filings

Speech Context
Journalistic or
Private letter
academic writing

Ungváry and
Irodalom Kft. v.
Hungary (2013)
Mustafa Erdoğan
and Others v.
Turkey (2014)
Barfod v. Denmark
(1989)
Prager and
Oberschlick v.
Austria (1995)
De Haes and Gijsels
v. Belgium
(1997)
Hrico v. Slovakia
(2004)
July and Sarl
Libération v.
France (2008)
Obukhova v. Russia
(2009)
Romanenko v.
Russia (2009)
Marian Maciejewski
v. Poland (2015)

Public
demonstration
Kuznetsov v.
Russia
(2008)
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Judge
Lawyer

Kyprianou
v.
Cyprus
(2005)

Bono v.
France
(2015)
Kincses v.
Hungary
(2015)

Party to
recent or
ongoing
judicial
proceedings

Saday v.
Turkey
(2006)

1*YW+ )n
Croatia
(2011)
Lopuch v.
Poland
(2012)

Kudeshkina v.
Russia (2009)
Schöpfer v.
Switzerland
(1998)
Amihalachioaie v.
Moldova (2004)
Morice v. France
(2015)
Weber v.
Switzerland
(1990)
Dumas v. France
(2010)
Karpetas v. Greece
(2012)

[33:4

Peruzzi v. Italy
(2015)

Skalka v.
Poland
(2003)
Bezymyannyy
v. Russia
(2010)

Note: Boldface indicates pro-FoE decision.

Consider a series of related holdings emerging from a single legal
dispute in France. In October 1995, French Judge Bernard Borrel,
who had been working as technical adviser to the Djiboutian
Minister of Justice, was found dead in a remote area outside the city
of Djibouti. 310 Local investigators concluded that he had committed
suicide, but his widow, also a judge, contested this finding, alleged
that her husband had been murdered, and persuaded French
authorities to investigate further.311 Mrs. Borrel hired Olivier Morice
to represent her in these further proceedings, and Morice arranged
for a potential witness to meet with the investigating judges and with
French media outlets.312 Borrell and Morice were dissatisfied with
the quality of the French investigation, and in March 2000,
Libération published an article entitled, “Death of a judge: widow
attacks judges and police,” which quoted the Chair of the
Professional Association of Judges and Prosecutors describing the
investigation as “rocambolesque” (“farcical”).313 At this point, the
310.
311.
312.
313.

Morice v. France, App. No. 29369/10, para. 10.
Id.
Id. paras. 12, 16.
July and Sarl Libération v. France, App. No. 20893/03, paras. 13-14, 74.
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investigating judges sued for defamation, and the French courts ruled
in their favor. 314 The publication director of the newspaper then
petitioned to the ECtHR, which found the French judgment to have
violated Art. 10. 315 In reaching this conclusion, the ECtHR noted that
as members of the judiciary, “[t]he offended individuals . . . [may not
have laid] themselves open to close scrutiny of their every word and
deed to the extent to which politicians do [but] . . . may nevertheless
be subject to wider limits of acceptable criticism than ordinary
citizens.”316 Meanwhile, Morice uncovered additional irregularities in
the investigation, and was quoted by Le Monde in September 2000
criticizing the investigating judges for engaging in “conduct which is
completely at odds with the principles of impartiality and
fairness.”317 The investigating judges again brought a defamation
suit, which was again successful in the French courts. 318 Morice
objected on Art. 10 grounds, but in July 2013, a divided ECtHR
chamber rejected his claims, emphasizing the distinct rules that
pertain to public speech by lawyers.319 These conflicting results in
virtually identical cases seemed to suggest divergent approaches
from the Strasbourg Court to anti-judicial speech by journalists as
compared to lawyers, but the case was subsequently referred to a
Grand Chamber, and in April 2015, the chamber holding was
unanimously reversed.320
This eventual result in the Morice case might be taken to suggest
that the Court has become increasingly protective of the freedom to
criticize judicial performance for all categories of speech claimants,
but this impression does not fit the data. For criticisms advanced by
litigants and litigators, the Court sometimes finds that they have gone
too far, and hence that their subsequent punishment has been
adequately justified. But it sometimes holds the reverse, and the
Court has not developed a clear line for distinguishing one set of
cases from the other.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. paras. 15, 18.
Id. para. 77.
Id. para. 74.
Morice v. France, App. No. 29369/10, paras. 12, 17, 33.
Id. para. 35-36.
Id. paras. 112, 132.
Id. para. 88.
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In Žugić v. Croatia (ECtHR 2011) and Łopuch v. Poland (ECtHR
2012), the ECtHR found no Art. 10 violations when parties in
pending civil proceedings (one of whom was also representing
himself) were held in contempt and convicted of criminal
defamation, respectively, for submitting written filings that insulted
the trial judges presiding over their cases.321 Observing that “the
work of the courts, which are the guarantors of justice and which
have a fundamental role in a State governed by the rule of law, needs
to enjoy public confidence,” the Łopuch court held that such work
“should . . . be protected against unfounded attacks” (para. 61).322 In
Kincses v. Hungary (ECtHR 2015), the Court similarly found no Art.
10 violation when a lawyer was disciplined for criticizing the trial
judge in a written appellate filing, and in A. v. Finland (ECtHR
2004), it found a similar Art. 10 claim inadmissible.323 It seems clear
that critical comments about named judges in a written court filing
might embarrass the targets in front of their colleagues, but it is hard
to see how they could pose any threat (let alone an imminent one) to
the administration of justice, as their primary audience is other
judges. To the contrary, punishing litigants and their advocates for
alleging in court that certain judges are biased against them (or
otherwise acting improperly) might itself pose a threat to the fair
administration of justice by leaving actual instances of judicial
impropriety unaddressed. As such, when French lawyer Sébastien
Bono was disciplined for claiming, in written pleadings before the
Court of Appeal, that French investigating judges had been complicit
in the torture of his client by Syrian intelligence agents, the ECtHR
found an Art. 10 violation, noting that Mr. Bono was acting on “the
lawyer’s duty to defend his clients’ interests” and that his “criticisms,
which had a factual basis, did not leave the courtroom because they
were contained in his written submissions.324 They were not therefore
capable of damaging the reputation of the judiciary in the minds of
321. Žugić v. Croatia, App. No. 3699/08, paras. 7, 13, 75; Łopuch v. Poland,
App. No. 43587/09, paras. 6-7, 70.
322. Łopuch v. Poland, App. No. 43587/09, para. 61.
323. Kincses v. Hungary, App. No. 66232/10, para. 3, 43; A. v. Finland, App.
No. 44998/98 at 2, 13.
324. European Court of Human Rights Press Release, ECHR 401 (2015),
Disproportionate Sanction Imposed on Lawyer Who Had Criticised Judges’
Procedural Decisions in Pleadings (Dec. 15, 2015).
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the general public.”325 The Court’s conclusion here is readily
defensible on conventional free expression grounds, and it lies in
significant tension with the Court’s holdings rejecting Art. 10 claims
in similar circumstances.
In sum, after some early missteps, the ECtHR routinely and
consistently defends free expression rights for journalists (and, less
often, scholars or dissidents) who allege that courts are biased and/or
corrupt. Since this description is undoubtedly true of at least some
courts operating in CoE member states, journalists, scholars, and
dissidents should certainly be free to say so, whether or not the
allegation has been proven (to the courts’ satisfaction!) in a particular
case. In some of these cases, the anti-judicial speech act undoubtedly
advanced rather than harmed rule-of-law interests. Note, for
example, Hrico v. Slovakia (ECtHR 2004), in which a weekly
magazine published an interview with a former president of the
Constitutional Court who criticized the country’s Supreme Court for
a recent speech-suppressive decision in a seditious libel case. 326 In
cases involving speech claimants who are litigants or litigators rather
than journalists, the ECtHR is sometimes speech-protective, but less
consistently so and with no readily discernible distinction that
comports with the standard justifications for curtailing anti-judicial
speech.
*****
The idea that free and open debate about courts might sometimes
pose a threat to the rule of law is long-standing and well-established,
dating to Blackstone’s and Wilmot’s eighteenth-century accounts of
common law contempt powers. Throughout this time, judges have
sometimes exploited these doctrines to justify repressive and
unnecessary silencing of public commentary on judicial
performance. As the Illinois Supreme Court recognized as early as
1842, these repressive actions by judges are more likely to
undermine than to buttress public confidence in the courts. Put
another way, if it is an empirical fact that judges sometimes abuse
their power, then the threat to judicial authority lies not with public
325. Id.
326. Hrico v. Slovakia, App. No. 49418/99, para. 9 (criticizing the judge for
manifesting his political views in public).
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discussion of these abuses, but with the abuses themselves.
Many of the cases reviewed in this paper are reminders that the
empowerment of independent courts is risky. Once empowered, after
all, courts will be enabled to thwart important democratic values. On
the other hand, if those courts develop into institutional sites of
commitment to such values, then the risks may be outweighed by
countervailing benefits. A wide range of constitutional (and quasiconstitutional) courts, operating in all regions of the constitutional
world, have sometimes defended free expression against state efforts
to silence public criticism of government policy and performance. To
date, only a handful of these courts have consistently done so with
regard to public criticism of courts themselves.
Indeed, across wide spans of time and space, judges have
repeatedly exhibited an inability to adequately distinguish between
speech acts that pose a genuine threat to the administration of justice
and those that merely offend judicial sensibilities. This distinction is
drawn from the strict clear-and-present-danger test endorsed by
Justice Black in Bridges, but it has been recognized by influential
jurists in a variety of other jurisdictions as well. As Justice Sachs
wrote, concurring in the Mamabolo case from South Africa:
[T]he words ‘scandalising’ and ‘disrepute’ . . . belong to an archaic
vocabulary which fits most uncomfortably into contemporary
constitutional analysis. They evoke another age with other values, when a
strong measure of awe and respect for the status of the sovereign and his
or her judges was considered essential to the maintenance of the public
peace. Constitutionalism arose in combat with mystique, and does not
easily become its bride. The problem is not simply that the nomenclature
is quaint – something not uncommon in legal discourse – but that it can be
misleading. . . . [T]he heart of the offence lies not in the outrage to the
sensibilities of the judicial officers concerned, but in the impact the
utterance is likely to have on the administration of justice. The purpose of
invoking the criminal law is not essentially to provide a prophylaxis for
the good name of the judiciary, as the term scandalising suggests. It is to
ensure that the rule of law in an open and democratic society envisaged by
the Constitution is not imperilled [sic]. There might be a link between the
repute of the judiciary and the maintenance of the rule of law. But it
would be a mistake to regard them as synonymous. Indeed, bruising
criticism could in many circumstances lead to improvement in the
administration of justice. Conversely, the chilling effect of fear of
prosecution for criticising the courts might be conducive to its
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deterioration.327

If Justice Black and Justice Sachs have it right, then a
constitutional court committed to democracy-reinforcing principles
of free expression must distinguish between hurt judicial feelings and
actual dangers to the rule of law, and must err on the side of
protecting the freedom to criticize courts.
Put another way, the transformation from Patterson to Bridges
marks an historically important step in the development of
constitutional free speech law, one that could be a more widely used
benchmark for assessing the commitment of various democratic
jurisdictions to free expression. In a democracy, political institutions
(and the leaders who occupy them) must tolerate criticism of their
decisions (and their competence and character); this rule applies to
courts no less than to legislatures and executives.328 Indeed, this rule
is a key indicator of courts’ democracy-reinforcing character. Put
still more directly, the judicial suppression of anti-judicial speech is
fundamentally incompatible with democratic governance,
particularly in an age when courts exert ever more lawmaking
authority of their own. Our claim here can be understood as a
friendly amendment of Harry Kalven’s well-known observation
regarding seditious libel: “[D]efamation of the government is an
impossible notion for a democracy. In brief, . . . the presence or
absence in the law of the concept of seditious libel defines the
society. A society may or may not treat obscenity or contempt by
publication as legal offenses without altering its basic nature. If,
however, it makes seditious libel an offense, it is not a free society
no matter what its other characteristics.”329 Kalven thought contempt
by publication lay outside the scope of the principle he was
articulating, but the principle may have reached more broadly than
he recognized.

327. State v. Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at 56 para. 70 (S. Afr.).
328. Michael K. Addo, Are Judges Beyond Criticism Under Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights?, 47 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 425, 432
(1998); Addo, supra note 40, at 3, 23.
329. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 105 (1965).

